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Clinical preventive services, such as cancer and cardiovascular (CVD) disease screenings
are critical components essential for reaching optimal population health outcomes. Although
clinical preventive services are recognized to save lives, roughly three-fourths of adults between
the ages of 50 and 64 and over 50% of adults aged 65 years and older forego clinical preventive
services. Private medical practitioners can provide such services. However, public sector entities,
such as local health departments (LHDs), can also deliver them in addition to population based
activities. Because of a possible substitution effect among health systems, we hypothesized that a
LHD’s choice to be involved with providing cancer or CVD screenings, is contingent on the
availability and capacity of other providers in the community. We merged the 2013 NACCHO
Profile Survey with the Area Health Resource Files (AHRF) and used maximum likelihood
estimation. Results revealed a LHD’s choice to be involved in performing CVD screening directly
in a LHD is statistically associated with the availability and supply of private providers in the
community, whereas involvement with cancer screening did not reach statistical significance.
Other key organizational and sociodemographic variables were strongly associated. The interplay
between health systems and its impact on population health outcomes further illustrates the need
to support public health practice and policy.
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CHAPTER 1
INTRODUCTION
Background
The delivery of clinical preventive services has gained political spotlight in the past
years. Private practices and clinics have been the traditional health system to deliver clinical
care, but they are not the sole community providers. Other health systems such as local
health departments (LHD) are unique in that they can provide both personal healthcare
services such as clinical preventive, medical treatment, and specialty care services and
implement activities for improving population health. Often, uninsured residents seek out
clinical preventive services from LHDs and other entities such as community health centers
that contribute to the “safety-net” to fill unmet health care needs. As part of the assurance
function of public health, LHDs can implement personal healthcare services directly or by
linking patients to other health care providers in the community by contracting out services.
LHDs can also choose to be uninvolved in the provision of personal healthcare services,
letting the community rely on the other healthcare providers to deliver care. Despite the
assurance function, however, who should “assure conditions in which people can be healthy”
is subject to debate, and disagreement on what role public health should play in directly
providing personal healthcare services is on-going.
The Institute of Medicine (IOM) defined public health as "[a] coordinated effort at
the local, state, and federal levels whose mission is fulfilling society's interest in assuring
conditions in which people can be healthy."1 Some LHD directors believe that offering
clinical services is a part of the overall mission of public health.2,3 Others follow the IOM
recommendations on the future of public health, which advise LHDs to shy away from
offering clinical services and focus on the core public health functions of assessment,
7

assurance, and policy development.4,5 In the early 2000s, Keane et al. conducted a series of
studies on LHD directors’ personal beliefs concerning privatizing public health services, not
offering clinical services, and discontinuing direct provision of these services.2,3,6–10 More
recent research by Hsuan and Rodriguez found that 198 large LHDs discontinued
approximately 5.6 clinical services per LHD from 1997 to 2008; however, more than 20%
of LHDs adopted new services.11 These findings suggest that despite declining trends in
direct provision of clinical preventive services, some LHDs still realize the value of offering
them directly.
Other recent research suggests trends within the wide variation in the provision of
personal healthcare delivery and its dependence on organizational, institutional, or
environmental factors. Luo et al revealed a positive association between clinical preventive
health services’ share of revenue and per capita expenditures.12 Recent research conducted
by Wright and Nice provides evidence that variation in the provision of primary care services
in LHDs is a function of health center availability in the county.13 Furthermore, Beatty and
colleagues identified major differences in direct clinical service provision in small and large
rural LHDs as well as urban LHDs.14
Statement of the Problem
Despite the evidence base on privatization and discontinuation of clinical preventive
health services, not much is known about the drivers behind an LHD’s decision to be
involved with clinical preventive healthcare services such as cancer and cardiovascular
disease screening. Understanding more about these decisions is important, as LHDs
exhibited higher levels of involvement in disease screening compared to the delivery of
primary care services in 2013.13 In a 2013 survey, approximately 83% of LHDs screened
for breast cancer, 88% screened for cervical cancer, and about 41% screened for colon
8

cancer.15 Some LHDs (19%) provide prostate cancer screening activities as a component of
primary prevention.16 For cardiovascular disease, 27% of all LHDs surveyed provided
preventive screening services in 2013.15
The Affordable Care Act (ACA), Medicaid expansion, and rising rates of insured
individuals have increased the demand for health care services and has simultaneously
created challenges for health care providers.17 Safety-net providers such as LHDs and
community health centers that offer clinical preventive health services will continue to play
an important role in filling unmet needs.17 This is especially important since, as Ku et al
discovered, most safety-net patients do not see these systems as a last resort; instead, they
actually prefer the types of care they receive there.17 In addition, since the implementation
of the ACA, the demand for primary care services has outpaced the supply.18 In many remote
regions of the United States, clinical preventive health services are simply not available.
Healthcare providers are either absent, unaffordable, or not accessible because of special
health care needs, insurance status or type, distance, or cultural barriers.18 Residents of these
communities depend on neighboring LHDs or community health centers for their healthcare
needs.
Purpose of the Study
Through early detection, chronic disease screening activities could have appreciable
implications on population health indicators as well as healthcare expenditures. On the
contrary, however, LHDs could also explore the possibility on focusing more on traditional
public health activities, since more people are increasingly obtaining health insurance
through the Medicaid expansions and state and federal health exchanges.19 These newly
insured individuals may seek other providers besides the LHD for healthcare needs.
Moreover, some believe that the decision to provide primary care services is contingent on
9

the availability and capacity of other safety-net providers in the area, such as FQHCs.13
Because of a possible substitution effect, we hypothesize that a LHD’s choice to provide
clinical preventive services such as cancer and cardiovascular disease screening are
dependent on the availability and supply of other healthcare providers in the community.
Conceptual Framework
The conceptual framework for our study draws from economic, organizational, and
management theories. Organizational theories of human service organizations20 (i.e.,
political-economy and institutional theories) are used to explain how the environment can
influence organizational structure, and hence decision making in the provision of service
delivery. The economic random utility theory provides a framework for LHD delivery
choice.
Organizational theories emerged more than 50 years ago in the public administration
literature. Some organizational theories are more applicable to human service organizations
than others because of the distinct characteristic that separates human services from others
— human services work on people to transform them.20 This attribute contributes to the
complexity of the nature of human service organizations. Thus, work from the 1970s by
Wamsley & Zald21 on political economy and Meyer & Rowan22 on institutional theory
provide salient frameworks for human service organizations,20 including public health
services and systems.11,23–27
The political-economy theory has several notable attributes that can be applied to
public health systems. First, it acknowledges that two fundamental types of resources must
be obtained by an organization in order to survive and yield services: (1) legitimacy and
power (i.e., political) and (2) production resources (i.e., economic).21 Wamsley & Zald
proposed that “just as nation-states vary in their political economies — their structure of rule
10

authority, succession to high office, power and authority distribution, division of labor,
incentive systems and modes of allocation of resources — so, too, do organizations.”21
Second, this theory stresses the importance of environments, especially the task
environment, composed of stakeholders that can be governmental or non-governmental
organizations or interest groups who are relevant because they have control of resources
needed by the organization or they have a stake so they can advance their own agendas.
Third, a key feature is the idea of resource dependence.28 Pfeffer and Salancik suggest that
as the dependence on resources controlled by an external entity increases, so does the
influence of that entity on the organization. Fourth, since an organization needs to possess
stability in the flow of external resources while simultaneously preserving independence and
autonomy, it can participate in strategies that range from competition to co-optation to
survive among members of the external environment.29 Fifth, within the organization, power
and economic relations regulate how service technology is applied and how decision-making
units are disseminated among the organizational divisions. However, important attributes of
the institution are lacking with the political-economy theory. Therefore, institutional theory
offers constructs that alleviates this limitation.
Institutional theory emphasizes societal and organizational values and norms, and
contends that the structure of certain types of organizations, namely human service
organizations, is determined not by technology but by rules originating from the institutional
environment.20 Public opinion from important constituencies, knowledge legitimated by the
educational system, by social prestige, by laws, and by the courts22 are examples of rules
from the institutionalized environment.
In addition to political-economy and institutional theories, economic theories such as
the random utility theory provides a framework for rational decision making and discrete
11

choices. Discrete choice random utility theory has three main assumptions: (1) choice is a
discrete event (0,1); (2) attraction or utility towards a service provision choice varies across
individual LHDs as a random variable; (3) the LHD chooses the service provision choice
with the highest utility. When a LHD chooses an option that produces the highest utility, it
can be best described as the degree of “want-satisfaction” provided by a product or service.
It is important to note, however, that utility and predicting choices cannot be measured
exactly since choices vary (and are random) across individuals LHDs. A LHD in our study
can choose between three discrete choices: (1) the choice to remain uninvolved and allow
others in the community independent of LHD funding provide the service; (2) contract out
the service; or (3) perform the service directly.
Organizational, Institutional, and Environmental characteristics
Drawing upon the attributes of political-economy and institutional theories, previous
empirical studies indicate that organizational, financial, and institutional characteristics
influence the public health system.11,23–26 These organizational and institutional attributes
likely influence service delivery arrangements among LHDs.
LHD workforce and staff may influence service delivery of personal health care
services. The presence of a clinician executive director (MD or DO) may play a role in the
decision to provide primary care services that include the clinical preventive services of
disease screening. By contrast, the presence of an executive director with a public health
education (MPH or DrPH) may also play a role.13
Funding affects the amount and types of resources consumed, workforce personnel
employed, and public health activities offered.23 It is not surprising that LHDs that face
financial constraints are more likely to share resources.26 Local tax bases and other sources
of revenue are used to fund public health services and activities.30 Economically
12

disadvantaged communities may have limited tax bases and face competition for resources
which can create difficulties in supporting the full array of public health activities.31,32
Political dynamics can influence an organization.26 Recent evidence revealed that
political dynamics such as the presence or absence of a local board of health influences
public health spending,24,33–35 performance,23

adoption and discontinuation of clinical

services among LHDs,11 and local health department collaborative capacity.25 Therefore,
investigating the effect of a local board of health is included in our study.
Local governmental public health agencies can function as centralized
administrative units of a state health agency or as decentralized, autonomous units of local
government.27 Districts and jurisdictions with a decentralized political structure have the
ability to differentiate themselves by providing specific arrangements of public services and
taxing structures.36 Decentralized political structures tend to be more informed and
responsive to local community needs27,33,37–40 and consequently increases societal wellbeing.36,40 Previous evidence illustrates that state-governed LHDs share resources most
extensively, as well as LHDs that cover multiple jurisdictions, and states with centralized
governance.26
Externalities and inequities are main concerns with decentralized units. Giving local
governments the power to provide services to their communities without funding support
from higher levels of government can make inequality worse if citizens self-select into
jurisdictions that are based on their capacity to pay for services.36 In other words, residents
with lower incomes may be forced to gravitate toward areas that have lower tax bases,
creating an unchanging cycle of decreased ability for local governments to pay for health
services offered by governmental agencies, such as LHDs. Centralizing the governmental
structures or coordinating decision-making across governments would internalize these
13

externalities by addressing spillover effects and correcting inequities.36,40
Governmental jurisdiction type (i.e., county versus multi-county) can also influence
the extent of shared organizational functions. According to Vest & Shah, shared
organizational functions were higher among LHDs with county and multicounty/district
jurisdictions compared to cities.26
Population characteristics that reflect the health needs and resources of a community
and the social and economic determinants influence an organization. Employment and
income, educational attainment, race and ethnicity, age, language and culture influence many
aspects of the public health system.41–48 In addition, geographic location could also be a
factor. Jurisdictions located in small or rural areas with smaller populations may spend more
on certain public health activities, which may lead some public health agencies to consider
sharing resources through mergers and consolidations, regional alliances, or joint operating
agreements23 or privatizing and contracting out services to other health systems.
Operational Definitions
A local health department is defined as, “an administrative or service unit of local or
state government concerned with health and carrying some responsibility for the health of a
jurisdiction smaller than the state.”49
LHDs exhibit large variations in personal healthcare services. Out of 87 public health
services surveyed in the NACCHO Profile studies, 22 services are considered personal
healthcare services.12 Luo et al collectively classified these 22 services, and adapted them
from Mays and Smith.24 Personal healthcare services are categorized as clinical preventive
services, medical treatment services, and specialty care services.12 We focused on the clinical
preventive services of cancer and cardiovascular disease screening
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Performed directly by the LHD
Some public health systems feel the pressure to assure access to medical care
services, especially in smaller and rural areas that face challenges with healthcare
professional shortages with large populations of low-income, uninsured, and underinsured
residents. This is because many LHD leaders still believe that offering these services is an
intrinsic part of the mission of public health The LHD helps to fill the gaps in the “safety
net.”3 Moreover, personal health care services can produce a significant proportion of
revenue from self-generated fee-for-service dollars that is used to perform core public health
functions.50 In a recent study conducted by Hsuan and Rodriguez, using panel data from
1997 and 208, 22.2% of LHDs surveyed maintained or adopted the provision of clinical
services.11 Adopter LHDs tended to offer personal healthcare services that generated
revenue.11 In a study conducted by Keane et al in 2001, 28% of LHD directors surveyed selfreported that LHDs were the primary provider of services to uninsured residents in their
jurisdictions.3
Contracted Out by LHD
Besides performing personal healthcare services directly, LHDs may choose to
contract out or privatize these services. Previous work by Keane et al conducted in the early
2000s provided insight to the beliefs as to why LHD directors blieved they should contract
out or privatize personal healthcare services and discontinue direct offerings.3,8,10,50–52
Surveys were sent to 380 LHD directors, and they obtained a completion rate of 75%. In one
study, when asked to hypothetically assume that no one was uninsured, 53% of LHD
directors believed that a LHD should provide personal healthcare services directly.3 Keane
et al also discovered that 73% of LHD directors surveyed privatized at least some public
health service.52 In another study by Keane et al on the same sample of directors, more than
15

half the directors believed that privatizing services had a positive effect on their department’s
performance of the core public health functions.50 Privatizing personal healthcare services
was the most common with 70 percent of LHDs contracting out to other healthcare providers
in the community.50 This included maternal and child health (20%), pediatric primary care
(19%), and family planning (12 %). Some communicable disease services were privatized
in almost a third (27%) of LHDs, with 13% percent privatizing HIV services, 9 % for STD
services other than HIV, and tuberculosis services (9%). All of these services are considered
to be personal healthcare services. Despite the positive effects of privatizing personal
healthcare services, privatization can also lead to the loss of revenue and result in less
funding to perform essential core public health activities necessary for improving population
health.12,50 In a recent study on personal healthcare services in LHDs to date conducted by
Luo et al,12 fixed effect panel models revealed a positive association between personal
healthcare services’ share of revenue and per capita expenditures from 2008-2013. LHDs
with jurisdiction sizes of <25,000 people highly depend on personal healthcare services to
maintain per capita expenditures.12
Contracting out services can be considered a form of cross-jurisdictional sharing. In
2013, around 50% of LHDs that served populations less than 500,000 and 35% of LHDs that
served more than 500,000 people shared resources such as equipment, staff, or funding with
one or more LHDs on a regular basis.15 Empirical evidence suggests that CJS can improve
both efficiency (i.e., achieving maximum results for every dollar that is invested) and
effectiveness (i.e., the scope and quality of services offered) of public health services.53 This
is because a greater volume of public health services would be delivered and fixed costs
would be distributed over a larger population of taxpayers and beneficiaries, lowering per
unit costs.23,36 Public health agencies that serve larger jurisdictions can achieve economies
16

of scale when performing public health activities that require high fixed costs, such as
surveillance systems.23 The sharing spectrum ranges from informal and customary
agreements with looser integration to complete consolidation of LHD agencies with tighter
integration.53,54
Provided by Others in the Community Independent of LHD Funding
Besides the LHD, private medical practices, clinics, and FQHCs can provide cancer
and cardiovascular disease screening. To date, there are 126,865 Family Medicine/General
Practice physicians,55 and as of 2013, there were 1,202 federally qualified health centers.56
Depending on the geographic location and need of the community, community and migrant
health centers (C/MHC), rural health clinics (RHC), and federally qualified health centers
(FQHC) can act as safety-nets and fill unmet healthcare needs. FQHCs served more than 20
million patients and operated more than 8,100 health care delivery sites in every state and
US territory in 2010.57 Furthermore, health centers provide a fourth of all primary care visits
for low-income individuals.58
Overview of Project Processes
Investigating if a LHD’s choice to be involved with the delivery of clinical preventive
services is contingent on the supply and availability of other healthcare providers in the
community who are independent of LHD funding, is the purpose of this dissertation.
Combining the 2013 National Association for County and City Health Officials (NACCHO)
Profile Data with the NACCHO Boundary Files and Area Health Resource Files
(AHRF)(2013-2014, 2014-2015), we conducted secondary data analysis with discrete choice
binary, multinomial, and sequential logit models using maximum likelihood estimation. We
focused on the specific clinical preventive services of cancer screening and cardiovascular
disease screening activities. Chapter 1 contains the overall purpose and significance, with a
17

general overview containing literature review and theory/conceptual framework as well as
operational definitions. Chapter 2 discusses the data sources and methodology used for
maximum likelihood estimation. Chapter 3 focuses on the cancer screening, and Chapter 4
focuses on the cardiovascular disease screening. Lastly, Chapter 5 contains overall
conclusions and discusses major implications for both public health and medical care
delivery systems.
Scope and Importance of Study
In summary, the provision of clinical preventive services by LHDs is of timely health
policy importance, as many Americans struggle with chronic diseases, such as cancer and
cardiovascular disease. In 2012, the Institute of Medicine published a report entitled,
Primary Care and Public Health: Exploring Integration to Improve Population Health, and
prompted new attention to the need for integration and collaboration among health systems
in order to achieve optimal population health outcomes. Therefore, it is crucial to re-examine
the level of involvement with offering healthcare services among LHDs12 and gain further
insight to the factors that influence a LHD’s choice to be involved with disease screening
activities.
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CHAPTER 2
METHODOLOGY
Introduction
This chapter presents an overview of the data sources, underlying utility theory, and
statistical methods used in Chapters 3 and 4. Data sources and description are described first.
Steps for merging the datasets are described next. Dependent and independent variables are
then discussed. Lastly, statistical analysis and specification tests are presented in detail.
Data Sources and Description
We used three different data sources for our studies. The study sample included
LHDs that participated in the 2013 National Association of County and City Health Officials
(NACCHO) Profile of Local Health Departments (Profile Survey).15 NACCHO conducted
the survey from January to March 2013. Rhode Island and Hawaii were not included in the
NACCHO Profile Survey because these states do not operate LHDs. The Profile survey
instrument encompassed a core questionnaire along with two separate modules. The core
questionnaire was disseminated to all local health departments in the United States. Each
module was disseminated to a random sample stratified by population served without
replacement. A total of 2,000 out of 2,532 LHDs completed the survey, making the overall
response rate 79%.15 For this study, we analyzed data from survey questions from the Core
questionnaire, (Activities section) focusing on the cancer and cardiovascular disease
screening activities.
The NACCHO Boundary Files were the second data set used for our studies. It
contains five digit Federal Information Processing Standard (FIPS) county codes. This code
is a unique identifier for counties and county equivalents. For example, the FIPS county code
for Fayette County, Kentucky is 21067.
19

The third data source was the Area Health Resource File (AHRF). The AHRF
contains a vast amount of data on health care supply factors such as information on
healthcare professionals, health facilities, utilization, expenditures, environment, and
workforce, for instance. The AHRF contains FIPS county codes that were used to link LHDs
to the NACCHO Profile Survey. To obtain 2013 variables, we pulled data from the 20132014 AHRF and the 2014-2015 AHRF.

For each activity in the charts below and on the following pages, check whether and how
your LHD provided that activity or service in your jurisdiction during the past year.







Indicate whether your LHD performed the activity and/or contracted out for it. Select
both boxes if your LHD both performed the activity directly and contracted out for it.
Contract out is defined as "Pay another organization to perform this activity or service
on behalf of your LHD".
“Provided by others in community independent of LHD funding” means that other
organizations provide these services and do not receive funding from the LHD to
provide them. Other organizations include but are not limited to other state and local
government agencies, other healthcare providers (e.g., private physicians, non-LHD
clinics, hospitals), schools, and community organizations.
If a service is provided by the LHD and others in the community, select both choices.
Do not leave any rows blank

Figure 2.1. Excerpt from the NACCHO Profile Survey. This illustrates the instructions for the survey
respondent and is taken directly from the “Activities” section.
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Figure 2.2. Flow Chart of Merging Datasets. This figure outlines the steps used for creating the
master dataset for the statistical analysis conducted in Chapters 3 and 4.

We obtained the NACCHO Profile Survey upon approval of an application from the
Interuniversity Consortium for Political and Social Research (ICPSR). The NACCHO
Boundary files were obtained from the NACCHO website. Likewise, the last dataset used
for our study, the Area Health Resource Files (AHRF), were obtained from their website as
well.
After obtaining all datasets, we merged them. Figure 1 illustrates the flow chart for
the steps taken to merge the datasets. We first merged the NACCHO Profile Survey dataset
with the NACCHO Boundary Files using the common variable, “nacchoid.” Each LHD is
designated a unique nacchoid. LHDs classified as, “city,” “multi-city,” and “city-county”
21

were dropped from the merged NACCHO dataset. Next we separated this dataset into
“county only” and “multi-county only.” For each separate dataset, we merged them with the
AHRF, using the “FIPS county code” as the merging variable. Since the AHRF contains
more FIPS county codes than NACCHO, several FIPS county codes without a matching
LHD were deleted. Next, we merged the county and multi-county LHDs together. Because
multi-county LHDs are comprised of several counties (with multiple FIPS county codes),
independent variables for the multi-county LHDs were summated if the variable was a count
or created into population weighted averages. Multi-county variables were then collapsed,
with one nacchoid per LHD. The final study sample consisted of 1,645 matched LHDs.
Variables
Dependent variable
Because we hypothesized that choosing to be involved with the delivery of clinical
preventive services (i.e., by contracting out or performing the service directly) is dependent
on the availability and supply of other healthcare professionals and systems in the
community, our dependent variable is a discrete choice (0,1). The first model we constructed
was a simple binary logit, in which whether or not a LHD was involved in delivering a
screening service. The choices of performing service directly or contracting out was
aggregated into the singular choice, “involved.” It is important to note that the survey
respondent from the NACCHO Profile was allowed to select more than one answer choice.
For discrete choice models, however, it is crucial that only one observation select one choice.
Therefore, we coded the variable to reflect only one answer choice, always keeping in mind
the most logical choice. For instance, if a LHD selected that it implemented cancer screening
directly and others in the community provide it, then the dependent variable was coded as
performed cancer screening directly.
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Subsequently, we expanded the choice set in the multinomial model, since a LHD
could choose between three options: (1) stay uninvolved and let others in the community
provide the service (base); (2) contract out; or (3) directly perform the service. We used a
multinomial logit model to discern if the three choices (as opposed to only two in the binary
logit model) are dependent on the availability and supply of other healthcare providers in the
community, while controlling for other covariates.

Figure 2.3 Conceptual Framework for the Discrete Choice Models. A LHD is first faced with the choice to become involved
with the delivery of a personal healthcare service such as cancer or cardiovascular disease screening. By contrast, a LHD could also
choose to be uninvolved in the screening activities, letting others (i.e., private practices, hospitals, FQHCs) independent of LHD
funding provide the service to the community. If the LHD does choose to be involved, then it has two options: (1) directly perform
the service or (2) contract out the service to other healthcare professionals in the community.

The binary and multinomial logit estimations use random utility discrete choice models. In
economics, utility can be described as the degree of “want-satisfaction” provided by a
product or service. In addition, choice behavior is contingent upon the assumption that
individuals make rational choices. Despite this assumption, however, utility and predicting
choices cannot be measured exactly. Therefore, in random utility models,
𝑢𝑖𝑗 = 𝑣𝑖𝑗 + 𝜀𝑖𝑗
utility, 𝑢𝑖𝑗 , given to individual i by choice j is made up of a deterministic component, 𝑣𝑖𝑗 ,
and an unobserved stochastic error component, 𝜀𝑖𝑗 . Therefore, a designated leader in a LHD
makes a rational choice, choosing the option that has the highest utility. Identifying if the
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decision to be involved in disease screening is dependent on the availability of other
providers in the community is the primary research interest. Furthermore, investigating if a
LHD’s decisions are sequential on a previous decision is also of interest, for reasons
explained later. The sequential logit models are not random discrete utility models, for they
are conventional binary logistic estimations done in sequence.
Independent variables
Because we hypothesized that choosing to be involved with the delivery of personal
healthcare services (i.e., by contracting out or performing the service directly), such as cancer
and cardiovascular disease screening activities, are dependent on the availability and supply
of healthcare providers in the community, our main independent variables of interest are
primary care physicians and midlevels (i.e., physician assistants, nurse practitioners, and
advanced practice nurses), who are the other healthcare providers independent of LHD
funding. We also controlled for institutional, financial, and community variables consistent
with previous public health services and systems research and organizational and
institutional theories.23,26
In terms of other healthcare supply factors, we controlled for the presence of a
federally qualified health center (FQHC) and total hospital beds per 10,000 population.
For demographic factors, we controlled for the percentages of non-white race,
Hispanic ethnicity, in poverty, and uninsured.
LHD staffing and leadership variables were LHD staff per 10,000 population,
percentage of LHDs with a clinician (MD, DO) executive director, and percentage of LHDs
with a public health (MPH, DrPH) executive director.
Variables for LHD governance characteristics included the presence of a local board
of health (LBOH) to measure LHD autonomy. To measure the state-local administrative
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relationship, we categorized the variable into shared (omitted), local, or state governance.
For geographic location, we created three dummy variables of rural (omitted), urban
(nonmetro), and metro, using the classification system established by the 2013 Rural Urban
Commuting Area codes. RUCA categories 1–3 were coded as metro, categories 4–7 were
coded as urban (nonmetro), and categories 8-9 were coded as rural.59
For LHD jurisdiction type, we included only county (omitted) or multi-county
variables.
Lastly, for LHD jurisdiction population size served, we categorized this variables
into 5 categories: population size served <25,000; 25,000-49,999; 50,000-99,999, 100,00 –
499,999 and >500,000.
2013 Rural-Urban Continuum Codes
Metro counties
1 Counties in metro areas of 1 million population or more
2 Counties in metro areas of 250,000 to 1 million population
3 Counties in metro areas of fewer than 250,000 population
Nonmetro counties
4 Urban population of 20,000 or more, adjacent to a metro area
5 Urban population of 20,000 or more, not adjacent to a metro area
6 Urban population of 2,500 to 19,999, adjacent to a metro area
7 Urban population of 2,500 to 19,999, not adjacent to a metro area
Completely rural
8 Completely rural or less than 2,500 urban population, adjacent to a metro area
9 Completely rural or less than 2,500 urban population, not adjacent to a metro area
Figure 2.4 2013 Rural-Urban Continuum Codes. Contains the code description of the
geographic categories.

There are several ways to define urban, suburban, and rural geographic regions of the
US.60 According to NACCHO, a LHD is defined as “an administrative or service unit of
local or state government concerned with health, and carrying some responsibility for the
health of a jurisdiction smaller than the state.”61 In the 2005 NACCHO Profile, NACCHO
classified urban, suburban, and rural LHDs based on Rural-Urban Commuting Area (RUCA)
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codes developed by the Economic Research Service of the US Department of Agriculture.
The codes classify census tracts using population density, daily commuting, and
urbanization.59,60,62 The 2013 NACCHO Profile did not classify LHDs using the RUCA
codes. However, RUCA codes are contained in the AHRF. Therefore, we determined which
geographic regions the LHDs belonged to by matching FIPS county codes from the AHRF.
We used the most recent RUCA codes from 2013.59 Using census tract demographic and
work commuting data, RUCA created 9 major categories. A RUCA code of 1.0, for instance,
signifies a metro county in which residents commute mostly within the area. RUCA
categories 1-3 were coded “metro,” categories 4–7 were coded “urban (nonmetro),” and
categories 8-9 were coded “rural.”
Statistical Analysis
Our research questions of interest are, “Is the decision to be involved with delivering
cancer or cardiovascular disease screening dependent on the availability or supply of other
healthcare professionals (health systems) in the community?” and “What factors lead
communities to lean on public versus private providers?”
After we successfully merged the datasets, we conducted specification tests.
Descriptive statistics were then generated to examine the distribution of responses. Sample
summary statistics are presented in Table 1 in Chapters 3 (cancer screening) and 4
(cardiovascular disease screening).
Specification tests to finding the preferred model
To account for the possibility of interactions, we created a model without interaction
terms (parsimonious) as well as a model with interaction terms. We conducted specification
tests to determine which the preferred model. To test for multi-collinearity, we employed
pairwise correlation tests for multicollinearity using the “correlate” command and the
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“collin” command. The variance inflation factor (VIFs) illustrated that all covariates were
acceptable for estimation. All covariates were between values of approximately 1.12-2.53,
signifying only mild correlation. Tolerance for all covariates were above 0.4 (As a rule of
thumb, a tolerance of 0.1 or less (equivalent to VIF of 10 or greater) is a cause for concern.)
It is important to note that some degree of collinearity is to be expected. Three covariates
had very mild collinearity and were the percent of people in poverty (VIF = 2.17), metro
location (VIF = 2.27) and jurisdiction population size (VIF = 2.53). Because of previously
published work and theory, we decided to keep the covariates in the model. Furthermore,
newer versions of Stata detect the presence of perfect collinearity and will drop variables
that are too collinear after estimation is executed. No covariates were dropped from our
models.
Both the parsimonious model and model with interaction terms were analyzed with
binary logit estimation. Binary logit estimation was used because of the discrete choice
dependent variable, and estimates are obtained through the use of maximum likelihood
estimation. For a study sample with N independent observations, the maximum likelihood
estimator (MLE), 𝛽̂ , maximizes the associated log-likelihood function
𝑁

ln 𝐿(𝛽) = ∑
𝑖=1

[𝑦𝑖 ln 𝐹(𝑥𝑖′ 𝛽) + (1 − 𝑦𝑖 ) ln{1 − 𝐹(𝑥𝑖′ 𝛽)}]

Accordingly, the MLE is produced by iterative methods. Furthermore, it is asymptotically
normally distributed. For each screening service, we conducted a binary logit estimation and
obtained beta values and average marginal effects (AME). The marginal effects are the
outcomes of interest because in non-linear models, they are more informative than beta
values.63 The standard errors for the marginal effects were obtained using the delta method,
in which Stata generated the output.
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Furthermore, we used log likelihood ratio tests (LR test) to determine the preferred
model. Log likelihood ratios are provided in the output post-estimation. A manual LR test
revealed that the parsimonious model (without the interaction terms) was indeed the
preferred model. The p-value for the chi square statistic was determined to be insignificant
after computation in Excel using the “CHI.DIST” function. The insignificant p-value
suggested that the model with interaction terms is not better than the parsimonious model.
Therefore, we chose to perform estimations with the parsimonious model.
Specification test between binomial and multinomial logit models
After estimation with the binary logit models, we also executed multinomial logit
estimation and obtained the maximum likelihood estimates of betas with standard errors and
average marginal effects (AME) predicted at each outcome (except the base of “not
involved”) with standard errors. For multinomial models, the maximum likelihood estimator
(MLE), 𝜃̂, maximizes the log-likelihood function:
𝑁

𝑚

ln 𝐿(𝜃) = ∑ ∑ 𝑦𝑖𝑗 ln 𝐹𝑗 (𝑥𝑖 , 𝜃)
𝑖=1 𝑗=1

It is important to note that the signs of the beta values may not have the same sign as the
MEs. We therefore conducted another manual LR test to determine if the binary or
multinomial model was the preferred model. The results revealed that the chi square statistic
was significant (p<.001), illustrating that the multinomial model is preferred over the binary
logit model.
Specification tests between multinomial and sequential logit models
After the completion of the multinomial estimations, we used the Hausman test to
determine if the multinomial model violated the independence of irrelevant alternative
assumption (IIA). The IIA is a part of the discrete choice theory and assumes that the relative
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odds of selecting between two or more choices are independent of other choices being
considered at the same time. For example, based on this assumption, a voter would have the
same odds of choosing between Trump and Clinton compared to choosing between Trump,
Clinton, and a third candidate running for Presidency. In essence, the IIA assumption is based
on the premise that when individuals have the opportunity to choose among a set of
alternatives, the odds of choosing A over B should not depend if another alternative, C, were
introduced as a choice.
The Hausman-McFadden64 and the Small-Hsiao65 test are the two most notable tests
for the IIA in multinomial models. Therefore, we conducted the Hausman test to determine
if our multinomial models adhered or violated the IIA assumption. After performing the
Hausman test on both the cancer and cardiovascular disease screening multinomial models,
the chi square statistic was not significant and negative, meaning the multinomial models
violated the IIA assumption. The results of this test suggest that the choices are nested within
one another. It is important to note two important attributes of the tests: (1) this assumption
is more applicable to conditional, nested logit models and (2) more recent work conducted
by Fry and Harris66,67 and Cheng and Long68, illustrate that both the Hausman-McFadden
and Small-Hsiao test perform poorly, despite large sample sizes. Cheng and Long even
concluded that, “tests of the IIA assumption that are based on the estimation of a restricted
choice set are unsatisfactory for applied work.” 68
Because the multinomial models failed the Hausman test (see Appendix I), we
constructed a sequential logit model, also known as hierarchical logit (see Appendix I). The
sequential logit estimation was used because of the nature of our research questions and the
lack of what is known as alternative specific covariates. The sequential logit model, in
simpler terms, is two separate conventional binary logit estimations, completed right after
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another. It is called this because the model proceeds in a sequential fashion, where the
individual enters transitions, one after the other, depending on the previous decision made.
We followed the procedure outlined by Rodriguez.69 For our research questions, we created
two transition phases, following the conceptual model illustrated in Figure 2.3. Transition 1
consists of whether or not a LHD is involved in performing a screening service. If the answer
is “yes,” then the LHD enters Transition 2. Focusing only on LHDs that chose to be
“involved,” Transition 2 consists of whether or not the LHD directly performs the service or
contracts it out. Each transition represents two separate binary logit estimations, with the
base for Transition 1 as “not involved” and the base for Transition 2 as “performed directly.”
Each sequential logit model produces a separate log likelihood value. The log likelihood
values from each binary logit estimation were then added together. That value was compared
against the log likelihood value of the multinomial estimation. Using a manual log likelihood
ratio test, the chi square statistic was not significant, providing further evidence that the log
likelihood values of the sequential logit models and the multinomial model were not
statistically different. The cancer multinomial model’s log likelihood value, for example,
was -1117.2108, and the combined log likelihoods of the two sequential logits added up to
-1118.4908. These values are almost identical. In fact, the multinomial model is actually
slightly better than the sequential logit models. The less negative the log likelihood, the
better.
Furthermore, a deviance test was also conducted. The chi square statistic was not
large and insignificant. If the null hypothesis, H0, has an insignificant p-value, then H0 cannot
be rejected. Therefore, it can be safely concluded that “the fitting of the model of interest is
substantially similar to that of the most completed model that can be built.”70 In other words,
this means that the two transitions of the sequential logit models put together are almost
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identical to the most completed model that can be built, which is the multinomial model.
Hence, the multinomial model is not statistically different from the sequential logit models,
and the sequential logit model is not superior. The results of the sequential logit estimations,
as well as the deviance specification tests, provide further evidence that the Hausman test of
the IIA assumption is indeed more than likely unsatisfactory for applied work.
Limitations
There are limitations of this study that should be noted. First, the study design is
cross-sectional. Associations can only be inferred, and a cause-effect relationship should not
be considered. Future studies could involve longitudinal data analysis. The 2016 NACCHO
Profile Survey is expected to be released in the near future, and the AHRF is expected to
have 2016 data released as well. Future studies could also consider our research question in
respect to identifying trends over time. Furthermore, these results are only generalizable to
county and multi-county LHDs. City, city-county, and multi-city LHDs were excluded from
this study, and therefore the results cannot be generalized to all LHDs. However, most LHDs
are on the county level and therefore, generalizability still carries considerable weight.
Conclusion
This chapter provides an overview of the methods, tests, and models that we
employed in Chapters 3 and 4. Specification tests helped to identify model fit. Discrete
choice models of binomial logit and multinomial logit provide maximum likelihood
estimation for our research questions.
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CHAPTER 3
CANCER SCREENING
Introduction
Clinical preventive services, such as guideline recommended cancer screenings for cervical,
breast, and colorectal cancers are crucial elements necessary for reaching national health targets.
Although clinical preventive services, such as cancer screening, are established to save lives, many
individuals do not utilitze these life-saving services. Approximately 75% of adults between 50 and
64 years old and more than 50% of adults 65 years and older forego clinical preventive services.71
The health consequences from under-utilization of cancer screening are extensive. Cancer is the
second leading cause of death in the United States, and approximately 1 in 4 individuals will fatally
succumb to some form of the disease.72
Disparities in cancer screening rates are widely apparent. Rural-urban differences in breast and
cervical cancer screening exist. According to recent research, despite a 10% increase in the overall
participation in mammography, a rural-urban differences remain. Women in remote rural area have
the highest likelihood of not receiving a timely mammogram.73 Furthermore, the same study
illustrated that Pap smear testing did not improve over an eleven year interval. Major factors that
were significantly associated with the lack of breast and cervical cancer screening among women
regardless of geographic area, included low socioeconomic status (SES), advanced age, and
minority race/ethnicity.73 In 2010, approximately 49% of all US counties lacked an OB-GYN
physician.74 The highest ratios of OB-GYNs per 10,000 women were found in metropolitan areas,
and the ratio declined as an area become more rural.74 In many rural areas, the family practice
physicians provided 100% of the obstetrical and gynecologic care, and a large majority of women
in rural areas do not receive recommended breast and cervical cancer screening services as part of
preventative care.74 Rural-urban disparities are apparent in colorectal cancer screening services as
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well. Gastroenterologists, general surgeons, and radiation oncologists traditionally provide
colorectal cancer screening services, but many rural areas do not have these specialists.
Approminately19% of LHDs provided this service in 2013, most likely because there is a lack of
providers who can provide it.75,76
The economic ramifications are as equally as considerable. Medical expenditures for cancer
treatment rose sharply within the past decade, increasing from $56.8 billion in the year 2001 (in
2011 USD) to $88.3 billion in 2011.77 National cost projections for cancer care for the year 2020
are as high as $206.59 billion.78
Because of the significant health, equity, and economic effects caused by cancer, health
systems must think of innovative solutions in order to mitigate the cancer burden. Local health
departments could be a part of the solution, since many entities are involved with providing cancer
screening. Recent evidence illustrates that LHDs exhibit higher levels of involvement in disease
screening compared to the delivery of comprehensive primary care services.13 In 2013, a majority
of LHDs screened for cervical (88%) and breast cancer (83%).15 Less than half of LHDs surveyed
screened for colon cancer (41%).15 However, other practitioners in the community can also provide
cancer screening services. In the private sector, obstetricians and gynecologists (OB-GYNs),
family medicine/general practice physicians, internal medicine physicians, as well as mid-levels
such as physician assistants (PAs), nurse practitioners (NPs), and advanced practice registered
nurses (APRNs) can provide them. Currently, there are approximately 48,610 OB-GYNs, 126,865
family medicine/general practice physicians, and 177,779 internal medicine physicians in the
United States.55 The total primary care physician workforce is 432,726. In the past decade, the
trend in the number of PAs practicing has more than doubled79 and currently PAs total 91,982.80
Nurse practitioners totaled 174,91881 and approximately 162,179 advanced practice registered
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nurses were active in 2012.82 Furthermore, providers in FQHCs can also provide cancer screening
services. In fact as of 2013, approximately 1,202 federally qualified health centers operated across
the United States.56
Through early cancer detection, screening activities could have sizeable impacts on
morbidity, mortality, life expectancy, and contribute to bending the cost curve. Local health
departments can have the ability to be involved in performing cancer screenings directly or by
contracting this service out to other providers. A third option is to simply stay uninvolved and let
others in the community who are independent of LHD funding provide the service. More people
are now insured through the health insurance exchanges and Medicaid expansions, and some
LHDs may reconsider focusing resources on more traditional public health activities,19 since these
newly insured individuals may seek other providers in the community for healthcare needs.
Because of a possible substitution effect, we hypothesize that a LHD’s choice to provide clinical
preventive services such as cancer screening is contingent on the availability and supply of other
healthcare providers in the community.
Conceptual framework
The conceptual framework for our study uses theories from the economic and
organizational and management literature. Political-economy theories explain how the political
and economic environments can influence organizational structure. Discrete choice and random
utility maximization (RUT) provide theoretical foundation for a LHD’s choice to be involved with
cancer screening.
Political-economy theories have several attributes applicable to public systems such as
LHDs. Two fundamental resources of (1) legitimacy and power (i.e., political) and (2) production
resources (i.e., economic)21 must be obtained by an organization in order to survive and yield
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services. Secondly, this theory stresses the importance of the task environment. The task
environment is composed of governmental and non-governmental organizations or interest groups
who have a stake in the interest and agenda because they have control of resources needed by the
organization. Furthermore, another attribute is resource dependence.28 As an organization becomes
more dependent on resources controlled by an external entity, the influence of that entity on the
organization increases as well. In addition, because an organization wants to achieve stability in
the flow of external resources but also remain autonomous, the organization can strategize through
competition or co-optation to survive.29 Lastly, within an organization, power and economic
relations regulate how service technology is applied and how decision-making units are distributed
among the organizational divisions.
Furthermore, an organization such as a LHD may choose an option that produces the
highest utility. In economics, utility can be described as the degree of “want-satisfaction” provided
by a product or service. Choice behavior is contingent upon the assumption that individuals make
rational choices, but utility and choice prediction are not measured with complete accuracy. Hence,
in random utility models,
𝑢𝑖𝑗 = 𝑣𝑖𝑗 + 𝜀𝑖𝑗
where utility, 𝑢𝑖𝑗 , given to individual i by choice j is made up of a deterministic component, 𝑣𝑖𝑗 ,
and an unobserved stochastic error component, 𝜀𝑖𝑗 .
Methods
We hypothesized that a LHD’s choice to be involved in cancer screening activities is
contingent on the availability and supply of other healthcare providers in the community
independent of LHD funding. Although OB-GYNs can perform breast and cervical cancer
screening, and gastroenterologists, for instance, can perform colon cancer screening, specialists
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were excluded from our study. They were excluded because these preventive services can be
frequently performed by primary care physicians and midlevels. We assumed that if screening
results are suspicious or pre-cancerous, then a specialist is referred. Therefore, we made the
assumption that the cancer screening activity conducted in the LHD and other primary care settings
practice primary prevention. Secondary and tertiary prevention would be conducted by specialists,
and therefore, they were excluded.
We used data from three sources. The primary dataset of interest was the National
Association of County and City Officials (NACCHO) Profile Survey 2013. Hawaii and Rhode
Island were not included in the survey because these states do not operate LHDs. We merged the
NACCHO Profile with the NACCHO Boundary Files, which contains Federal Information
Processing Standard (FIPS) County codes. We obtained the FIPS County codes in order to merge
the NACCHO datasets with the Area Health Resource File (AHRF). Since our study was crosssectional in nature, focusing on 2013, we pulled data from the 2013-2014 and 2014-2015 AHRF.
We excluded LHDs classified as city, city-county, or multi-city because we wanted to focus on
county and multi-county level LHDs only. Most LHDs in the US operate on the county level.
Variables that contained count data were aggregated and population weighted averages for multicity jurisdictions were calculated. All three datasets were merged into one master dataset, used for
the analyses. A total of 1,645 LHDs were contained in the master dataset.
We used specification tests to first find the preferred model, comparing a binary logit
estimation model with interaction terms and one without. We also conducted pairwise correlation
tests. We also used multicollinearity tests and determined that all covariates should be kept in the
model, for none of them were severely collinear, according to the variance of inflation factor (VIF).
An insignificant LR test revealed that the parsimonious model without interaction terms is the
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preferred model over the model with interaction terms. A binary logit estimation with the
parsimonious model was estimated, with the dependent variable as, “not involved =0” and
“involved=1.” Not involved was defined as, “the LHD is not involved in the provision of cancer
screening, since others in the community independent of LHD funding already provides the
service.”
A multinomial logit model was then estimated with the three choices in the dependent
variable. In our study, the choices a LHD would face would be to (1) remain uninvolved and let
others in the community independent of LHD funding provide the service; (2) contract out the
service; or (3) perform cancer screening directly. To test the independence of irrelevant alternative
assumption (IIA), we implemented a Hausman test. It is important to point out, however, that
research reveals that the Hausman tests performs poorly, even in large sample sizes.68 Because of
the failed results, we then estimated the sequential logit models.
A sequential logit model can be described as if decisions were made in a sequence of
stages or transitions. We followed the procedure outlined by Rodriguez.69 To answer our specific
research question, we assumed that a LHD experiences two transition phases (see Figure 1).
Transition 1 consists of whether a LHD is involved in performing a screening service. If it is
involved, then the LHD enters Transition 2. Among only those LHDs that selected it is involved
with the provision of cancer screening, it then enters the Transition 2. Transition 2 consists of
whether the LHD directly performs the service or contracts it out.
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Figure 3.1 Conceptual Framework for the Discrete Choice Cancer Models. A LHD is first faced with
the choice to become involved with the provision of cancer screening. By contrast, a LHD could also choose
to be uninvolved in the screening activities since others (i.e., private practices, hospitals, FQHCs)
independent of LHD funding provide the service to the community. If the LHD does choose to be involved,
then it has two options: (1) directly perform the service or (2) contract it out to other healthcare
professionals in the community.

Each transition represents two separate binary logit estimations. The base (omitted
reference group) for Transition 1 is “not involved,” and for Transition 2, it was “perform directly.”
Each sequential logit model produces separate log likelihood values that are then added together
to get an overall sequential logit model log likelihood value. That value was manually compared
against the log likelihood value of the multinomial estimation, using the LR test in Excel. It was
determined that the log likelihood values of the sequential logit models and the multinomial model
were almost identical, and it was not better than the multinomial model. The log likelihood of the
cancer multinomial model was -1117.2108, and the summed log likelihoods of the two sequential
logits added up to -1118.4908. The log likelihood values from the multinomial and the sequential
logits are almost identical. Moreover, the multinomial model’s log likelihood is actually slightly
better than the sequential logit models. In addition, a deviance test was carried out. The chi square
statistic was small and insignificant, meaning that the multinomial model is not statistically
different from the sequential logit models. Because the multinomial model is actually slightly
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better than the sequential logit model (less negative log likelihood value), this provides further
evidence that “tests of the IIA assumption that are based on the estimation of a restricted choice
set are unsatisfactory for applied work.”68
Because we hypothesized that the choice to be involved in cancer screening activities is
contingent on the availability and supply of other healthcare providers in the community, the
dependent variable is a discrete choice (0,1). For the multinomial logit estimation, we extended
the choice set to three options: (1) stay uninvolved and let others in the community provide the
service (base); (2) contract out; or (3) directly perform the service. It is important to note that since
the LHDs that participated in the NACCHO Profile Survey were allowed to select more than one
option, we coded the dependent variables to account for only on choice per LHD. We also reflected
the most logical choice. For example, if a LHD survey respondent selected that his or her agency
performs the cancer screening activity directly and others in the community also provide the
service, the code would generate a “1” for the choice of “performing directly.” Because of the
inherent nature of the discrete choice models, only one choice per observation is required for the
discrete choice models we employed.
Our primary independent variables of interest are the other providers independent of LHD
funding, which are primary care physicians and midlevels (i.e., physician assistants, nurse
practitioners, and advanced practice nurses). We also controlled for institutional, financial, and
community covariates that are consistent with previous public health services and systems
research.11,23,26
For healthcare supply factors, we controlled for primary care physicians per 10,000
population, midlevels per 10,000 population, the presence of a federally qualified health center
(FQHC), and total hospital beds per 100,000 population. Recent research illustrates that primary
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care provision in LHDs is a function of the presence of a FQHC.13 Total hospitals beds per 100,000
is used to reflect capacity, and is therefore a better measure for the potential substitution effect, as
opposed to the total number of short term general hospitals.
Sociodemographic factors are known to play roles in the provision of clinical or personal
healthcare services, as low income, indigent, or uninsured populations rely on safety-nets for their
healthcare needs. Therefore, we controlled for the percentages of non-white race, Hispanic
ethnicity, people in poverty, and uninsured.
LHD staffing and leadership variables were LHD staff per 10,000 population, percentage
of LHDs with a clinician (MD, DO) executive director, and percentage of LHDs with a public
health (MPH, DrPH) executive director. Previous research sheds light on the role of a clinician
executive director on the provision of certain clinical preventive services.13
Political-economy theories suggest that the political and economic environment can
influence an organization’s agendas and choices. We included the presence of a local board of
health (LBOH) to measure LHD autonomy and controlled for measurements for the state-local
administrative relationship. The variable was categorized into shared (omitted), local, or state
governance.
For LHD geographic location, we created three dummy variables of rural (omitted), urban
(nonmetropolitan), and metropolitan, using the classification system established by the 2013 Rural
Urban Commuting Area (RUCA) codes. RUCA categories 1–3 were coded as metro, categories
4–7 were coded as urban (nonmetro), and categories 8-9 were coded as rural.59
For LHD jurisdiction type, we included only county (omitted) or multi-county variables.
Lastly, LHD jurisdiction population size served may play a role in the decision to become involved
in cancer screening care, as smaller LHDs may be more likely contract out or share resources
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across jurisdictions; or, larger LHDs may have the capacity to offer services beyond the traditional
public health activities. We categorized this variables into 5 classifications based on population
size served: < 25,000; 25,000-49,999; 50,000-99,999, 100,000 – 499,999 and >500,000.
Results
Summary statistics for the study sample are presented in Table 3.1. Around 41% of LHDs
provide cancer screening services. In terms of healthcare supply factors, on average, there are 5.8
primary care physicians and 11.7 midlevels per 10,000 population. There are 8.9 LHD staff per
10,000 population. Almost a fifth of LHDs surveyed (19.3%) have a public health executive
director, and only 11.9% have a clinician director. Furthermore, 70.3% of LHDs have a local board
of health (LBOH). More than half (66.8%) of LHDs have a local governance classification, while
22.4% and 10.8% have a state and shared governance, respectively. The majority of the sample is
composed of single county LHDs (88.9%). Jurisdiction population size served varies, with 36% of
LHDs in our sample serving populations less than 25,000 and only 7% of LHDs serving population
sizes larger than 500,000. The number of FQHCs delivery sites average 3.6 per 100,000 population.
The percent of individuals in poverty and who are uninsured both average around 16%, while 15.2%
of the sample are classified as non-white. Geographic region is divided into 38.9% of LHDs being
located in metro areas, 38.6% in urban (nonmetro) areas, and only 13.9% in rural regions.
Table 3.1 - Sample Summary Statistics
Variable
Health care supply factors
Primary care physicians per 10000 population
Midlevels (PAs, NPs, APRNs) per 10000 population
FQHC present in counties, %
FQHC delivery sites per 100000 population
Total hospital beds per 100000 population
General hospitals per 100000 population
Demographic factors
% White race
% Non-white race
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Mean (SD)

Range

5.8 (3.2)
11.7 (7.6 )
58.6
3.6 (8.8)
324.9 (430.06)
4.63 (7.4)

0-24.5
0-100.9
0-128
0-208.2
0-7815.9
0-86.2

84.8 (14.6)
15.2 (14.6)

15.5-99
.99-84.5

% Hispanic ethnicity
7.1 (10.3)
.22-95.7
% In poverty
16.6 (5.7)
3.8-41.1
% Uninsured
16.5 (4.8)
6-36.8
LHD service provision
% LHDs providing cancer screening
0-100
41.3
LHD staffing and leadership
LHD staff per 10000 LHD population
8.9 (10.8)
0-195.8
% LHDs with clinician (MD, DO) executive director
0-100
11.9
% LHDs with public health (MPH, DrPH) executive director
0-100
19.3
LHD governance characteristics
Local board of health (LBOH) present
70.3
0-100
State governance
0-100
22.4
Local governance
0-100
66.8
Shared governance
0-100
10.8
LHDs by location
% Metro
0-100
38.9
% Urban (nonmetro)
0-100
38.6
% Rural
13.9
0-100
LHDs by jurisdiction
% County
0-100
88.9
% Multi-county
0-100
11.1
LHD jurisdiction population size served
Population size served < 25,000
36.0
0-100
Population size served 25,000 - 49,999
0-100
20.1
Population size served 50,000 - 99,999
0-100
15.8
Population size served 100,000 - 499,999
21.0
0-100
Population size served > 500,000
7.0
0-100
N = 1,645 Local Health Departments
Abbreviations: FQHC, federally qualified health center; LHD, local health department

The results of the binary logit estimation are illustrated in Table 3.2, and the results of the
multinomial model are presented in Table 3.3. The results of the sequential logit model for cancer
screening are in Appendix II. The multinomial model proved to be a superior model to the
sequential logit. Beta values and standard errors, as well as marginal effects (ME) along with
standard errors are reported in the tables. It is crucial to point out that the signs of beta values may
not have the same sign as the MEs. Primary interest is in how probabilities change as the covariates
change, and MEs will provide that information.63 Therefore, interpretation from the estimations
refer to the statistically significant MEs. Primary care physicians and midlevels per 10,000
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population did not have significant beta values or MEs. The type of LHD director was not
statistically significant either.
However, other variables had statistically significant MEs. A unit increase in the
percentage of the people in poverty increases a LHD’s probability to choose to be in involved in
the delivery of cancer screening activity by 1.3% (p<.001). Furthermore, a LHD’s location in a
metro area increases the probability of choosing to be involved in the delivery of this activity by
10.2% (p<.05). Serving a jurisdiction population size between 50,000 to 99,999 and 99,999 499,999 people increases the probability of delivering this activity by 14.4% (p<.001) and 11.7%
(p<.05), respectively. By contrast, having a state or local governance decreases the probability of
being involved with cancer screening by 30.6% (p<.001) and 43.6% (p<.001), respectively.
Table 3.2 - Results of the Binary Logit Estimation of Whether or Not a LHD is Involved in
Delivering Cancer Screening Activity
Variable
Primary care physicians per 10000 population
Midlevels (PAs, NPs, APRNs) per 10000 population
FQHC present in counties
Total hospital beds per 100000 population
% Non-white race
% Hispanic ethnicity
% In poverty
% Uninsured
LHD staff per 10000 LHD population
LHD with clinician (MD, DO) executive director
LHD has a public health (MPH, DrPH) executive director
Local board of health (LBOH) present
Centralization (shared is omitted reference group)
State governance
Local governance
LHD location (Rural is omitted reference group)
Metro
Urban (nonmetro)
LHD jurisdiction population size served (<25,000 is
omitted reference group)
Population size served 25,000 - 49,999
Population size served 50,000 - 99,999
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β
0.009
-0.002
0.074
0.000
-0.005
-0.013
0.060a
0.032
0.019
-0.204
0.256
0.189

SE
0.024
0.010
0.137
0.000
0.005
0.007
0.015
0.017
0.007
0.190
0.145
0.137

ME
0.002
-0.000
0.016
-0.000
-0.001
-0.003
0.013a
0.007
0.004
-0.042
0.055
0.039

SE
0.005
0.002
0.029
0.000
0.001
0.001
0.003
0.004
0.001
0.039
0.031
0.028

-1.519a
-2.084a

0.252
0.237

-0.306a
-0.436a

0.043
0.038

0.481b
0.128

0.216
0.191

0.102b
0.027

0.045
0.040

0.258
0.683a

0.173
0.194

0.053
0.144a

0.036
0.041

0.228
0.048
0.559b
0.117b
Population size served 100,000 - 499,999
0.608
0.327
0.128
0.070
Population size served > 500,000
0.139
0.233
0.029
0.050
LHD jurisdiction (county is omitted reference group)
Log likelihood = -950.282778
N = 1,565 Local Health Departments
Abbreviations: ME, marginal effect; FQHC, federally qualified health center; LHD, local health
department
a
P<.001
b
P <.05

Contract Out
For the multinomial models, we first examined the choice of contracting out the cancer
screening service to others in the community. The presence of a FQHC increases the probability
of a LHD contracting out cancer screening services by 2% (p<.05), as opposed to staying
uninvolved (base) because other healthcare providers already deliver the service. A unit increase
in the percentage of uninsured individuals decreases the probability of contracting out by .38%
(p<.05). Having a local or state governance decreases the probability of contracting out by 9%
(p<.01), and 7% (p<.05), respectively. Furthermore, a multi-county jurisdiction decreases the
probability of contracting out by 2.96% (p<.01).
Perform Directly
A unit increase in the percentage of the people in poverty decreases a LHD’s probability
to choose to directly perform cancer screening service activity by 1.25% (p<.001), as opposed to
staying uninvolved. Furthermore, a unit increase in the percentage of uninsured individuals
increases the probability to directly perform cancer screening by 1.05% (p<.01). As the LHD staff
per 10,000 LHD population increases, the probability increases by .34% (p<.05). Having a public
health executive director increases the probability of performing cancer screening services directly
by 6.59% (p<.05). Furthermore, having a local or state governance decreases the probability of
performing cancer services directly by 22% (p<.001) and 35.9% (p<.001), respectively. LHD
location in a metro area increases the probability of performing this service directly by 10.56%
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(p<.05). Serving jurisdiction population sizes of 50,000 – 99,999 and 100,000 – 499,999 increases
the probability of directly performing cancer screening activities by 13.1% (p<.01) and 9.8%
(p<.05), respectively.
Table 3.3 - Results of the Multinomial Logit Estimation of Cancer Screening Delivery Choice
Contract out

Variable
Primary care physicians per 10000
population
Midlevels (PAs, NPs, APRNs) per
10000 population
FQHC present in counties
Total hospital beds per 100000
population
% Non-white race
% Hispanic ethnicity
% In poverty
% Uninsured
LHD staff per 10000 LHD
population
LHD with clinician (MD, DO)
executive director
LHD has a public health (MPH,
DrPH) executive director
Local board of health (LBOH)
present
Centralization (shared is omitted
reference group)
State governance
Local governance
LHD location (Rural is omitted
reference group)
Metro
Urban (nonmetro)
LHD jurisdiction population size
served (<25,000 is omitted
reference group)
Population size served 25,000 49,999
Population size served 50,000 99,999
Population size served 100,000 -

Perform Directly

β

SE

ME

SE

β

SE

ME

SE

-0.0239

0.0587

-0.0009

0.0018

0.0105

0.0247

0.0025

0.0051

0.0103

0.0208

0.0004

0.0007

-0.0034

0.0099

-0.0009

0.0020

0.7141

0.3809

0.0209c

0.0105

0.0182

0.1398

-0.0060

0.0286

0.0002

0.0003

0.0000

0.0000

-0.0002

0.0002

0.0000

0.0000

0.0083
-0.0046
0.0415
-0.0994c

0.0126
0.0213
0.0365
0.0486

0.0004
0.0001
0.0004
-0.0038c

0.0004
0.0007
0.0011
0.0016

-0.0066
-0.0132
0.0630a
0.0429c

0.0051
0.0071
0.0148
0.0173

-0.0015
-0.0027
0.0125a
0.0105b

0.0010
0.0015
0.0029
0.0035

0.0238c

0.0118

0.0005

0.0003

0.0179b

0.0067

0.0034c

0.0013

-0.0623

0.4449

0.0013

0.0141

-0.2241

0.1950

-0.0450

0.0383

-0.2504

0.3901

-0.0116

0.0103

0.2938c

0.1474

0.0659c

0.0310

0.6065

0.4013

0.0152

0.0101

0.1529

0.1393

0.0233

0.0280

-2.9913a
-2.5481a

0.6445
0.4231

-0.0915b
-0.0762c

0.0298
0.0299

-1.4272a
-2.0289a

0.2543
0.2407

-0.2200a
-0.3594a

0.0478
0.0432

0.0751
-0.1389

0.6800
0.6174

-0.0052
-0.0065

0.0217
0.0186

0.5101b
0.1438

0.2196
0.1939

0.1056c
0.0321

0.0451
0.0402

0.6259

0.5176

0.0143

0.0142

0.2352

0.1760

0.0401

0.0351

0.8478

0.5757

0.0146

0.0159

0.6770a

0.1981

0.1309b

0.0406

0.8923

0.6496

0.0189

0.0190

0.5302b

0.2331

0.0982c

0.0476
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499,999
Population size served > 500,000
1.1846 0.8320
0.0312
0.0321
0.5428
0.3360
0.0947
LHD jurisdiction (county is omitted
-1.3668 0.9033 -0.0296b 0.0107
0.2394
0.2364
0.0641
reference group)
Log likelihood = -1117.2108
N = 1,565 Local Health
Departments
Abbreviations: ME, marginal effect; FQHC, federally qualified health center; LHD, local health department
a
P <.001
b
P <.01
c
P <.05

0.0696
0.0497

Discussion
The number of primary care physicians and midlevels per 10,000 population were not
statistically significant in either the binary or multinomial logit estimations. This is a surprising
finding, as we hypothesized that the choice to become involved in cancer screening activities in
the LHD was contingent on the availability and supply of other healthcare providers in the
community.
The type of LHD director was not statistically significant in the binary logit model, but in
the multinomial model, having a LHD director with a public health degree (MPH, DrPH) increased
the probability of performing the cancer screening activity directly. A LHD director with a public
health degree may see performing cancer screening services directly as part of the mission of
public health through prevention and early detection. The LHD director may have some influence
on the decision to be involved with providing cancer screening directly, by choosing to perform
cancer screening directly or contracting out the service.
The FQHC is known to act as a safety-net for impoverished people with low incomes. The
results of both estimations provide statistically significant evidence that as the percentage of people
in poverty increases, so does the LHD’s probability of staying uninvolved in the delivery of cancer
screening activity. The most logical explanation for this is because impoverished individuals may
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seek care from other providers and health systems such as FQHCs instead. In fact, this postulate
is supported by results from the multinomial logit estimation. The presence of a FQHC increases
the probability of contracting out cancer screening services. This may be because LHD directors
may be aware of the value of contracting out this service to a FQHC because the impoverished
individuals are more likely to go to the FQHC to receive the service.
In addition, as the percentage of uninsured individuals increase, the probability of a LHD
contracting out or directly performing cancer screening services declines with statistical
significance. In other words, as the percentage of uninsured individuals increase, the probability
of a LHD being staying uninvolved and letting others in the community provide cancer screening
increase. This observation may be due in part to the National Breast and Cervical Cancer Early
Detection Program (NBCCEDP), as this program entails a network of various health systems and
providers who already provide this service in the community. The NBCCEDP is a federal program
through the Centers for Disease Control and Prevention (CDC) that “provides low-income,
uninsured, and underserved women access to timely breast and cervical cancer screening and
diagnostic services.”83 The NBCCEDP is composed of a network of more than 22,000 clinical
providers in various health systems that include LHDs, FQHCs, private practices, safety-net
hospitals, and other health systems. More recently, the CDC funded the Colorectal Cancer Control
Program (CRCCP) in 2009 with goals to increase colorectal cancer screening rates in adults aged
50 to 75. These cancer screening programs entail partnerships and collaborative capacity among
the various health systems. Every LHD works with this network of clinical providers to provide
the services.83
Geographic location also plays a role in a LHD’s decision. The binary logit estimation
revealed that a LHD that is located in a metro area has a higher probability of choosing to be

47

involved in the delivery of this service. The multinomial model revealed the specific choice — a
LHD location in a metro area increases the probability of performing this service directly by
10.56%. This may be because LHDs that serve larger jurisdictions may have adequate resources
and choose to deliver this service regardless of community need.13
In addition to geographic location, jurisdiction population size served also is statistically
significant. The binary logit model first revealed a statistically significant association between
jurisdiction population sizes served of 50,000 to 99,999 and 100,000 to 499,999 and the increasing
the probability of a LHD’s choice to be involved. The multinomial logit model revealed that
serving jurisdictions with those population sizes increases the probability of performing cancer
screening activities directly. This is perhaps because larger LHDs have the resources, staff, and
capacity to perform this screening service in-house. This conjecture is supported by the fact that
as the LHD staff per 10,000 LHD population increases, the probability of performing cancer
screening directly increases by .34%. It is interesting to point out, however, that jurisdictions with
population sizes smaller than 25,000 and greater than 500,000 were not statistically significant.
Perhaps smaller, low resource communities may rely on the presence of a FQHC for cancer
screening services. On the other end, LHDs that serve large jurisdictions may simply have enough
resources, staff, and funding to directly perform cancer screening.
Moreover, the binomial logit estimations revealed that having a state or local governance
decreases the probability of being involved with cancer screening. The results of the multinomial
models revealed that a local or state governance decreases the probabilities of both contracting out
and directly performing the screening activity. This implies that the LHD with a state or local
governance chooses to be uninvolved. A previous study by Mays & Smith illustrated that public
health spending was 24% lower in centralized state agencies, as opposed to independent local
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agencies.84 It may be possible that centralized state LHDs may be more concerned with finances
and budgets, and local agencies may be more knowledgeable of the specific community needs and
availability of private providers compared to the state agencies.
Lastly, having a multi-county jurisdiction type decreases the probability of contracting out
the service by almost 3% as opposed to staying uninvolved and allowing others independent of
LHD funding provide the service to community residents. This finding could possibly be explained
by the fact that multi-county LHDs may be more aware of the other healthcare providers and health
systems in their jurisdiction, since their territory spans multiple counties, forcing them to
communicate with other LHDs. This might also allow multi-county LHDs to make more informed
decisions, partially influencing the decision to remain uninvolved.
Limitations
There are some limitations of this study to this study. First, this study is cross-sectional in
nature. A cause-effect relationship should not be considered. Future studies could involve
longitudinal data analysis, as the 2016 NACCHO Profile Survey is due to be released, and the
AHRF is expected to have 2016 data released as well in the near future. Furthermore, these results
are only generalizable to county and multi-county LHDs However, most LHDs are on the county
single level. Lastly, a final limitation is that gynecologists were not included in the primary care
physician variable since debate on classifying gynecologists as primary care physicians as opposed
to specialists/surgeons is on-going; therefore, including gynecologists in the primary care variable
in a future study may have an impact on statistical significance.
Conclusion
Although the results suggest that the decision to become involved with cancer screening
activities is not dependent on the availability or supply of physicians or midlevels, we still gained
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valuable information. Several organizational, institutional, and environmental characteristics are
associated with a LHD’s decision to provide cancer screening activities either through performing
it directly or contracting it out. The presence of a public health director, the number of LHD staff,
metropolitan location, jurisdiction population size served, as well as jurisdiction type, are all
significantly associated with the LHD’s decision. An overall trend suggests that as population size
increases, so does the probability of involvement with cancer screening. This study has important
public health ramifications, as Mays and Smith previously revealed over a 13 year time period,
that for every 10% increase in public health spending, cancer mortality fell by 1.1 percent.84 In
conclusion, these findings have viable practice and policy significance that will greatly benefit the
public’s health now and in the future.
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CHAPTER 4
CARDIOVASCULAR DISEASE SCREENING
Introduction
Heart disease is the number one cause of death in the United States, and stroke comes
in third. Approximately, 27.6 million people are currently diagnosed with CVD, and as of
2013, 611,105 individuals died from it.85 Clinical preventive services, such as cardiovascular
disease screenings, are fundamental for protecting the public’s health and reaching national
health targets, such as Healthy People 2020. Cardiovascular disease (CVD) screenings help
detect heart conditions that have the potential to lead to a stroke or heart attack and include
physical examinations and lifestyle discussion, evaluation of family history, and blood tests
for cholesterol, lipid, and triglyceride levels. Despite the established effectiveness of clinical
preventive services, including CVD screening, around three-fourths of adults between 50
and 64 years old and more than half of adults 65 years and older forego clinical preventive
services.71
The economic burden from CVD on the US healthcare system is significant, as
almost every 6 healthcare dollars is spent on CVD. In 2011, the nation’s healthcare system
spent almost $1 billion a day in medical costs, and by the year 2030, yearly direct medical
costs for CVD and lost productivity costs could increase to over $818 billion and $275 billion
dollars, respectively.86
In addition to a large economic burden, equity issues arise, as racial and ethnic
disparities with CVD mortality are higher in individuals with low educations and African
American populations87 in addition to individuals who reside in rural areas, especially those
who live in the South.88
Despite the paramount importance of CVD screening, many individuals do not have
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access to such services. Disparities in the capacity and distribution of private providers who
provide CVD screening are apparent. Evidence illustrates that CVD screening in rural areas
is suboptimal.89 The suboptimal rates are also due in part to primary care workforce shortages
that plague many rural areas and other medically underserved areas. Lack of insurance is
also a factor that contributes to suboptimal CVD screening rates. Low CVD rates have
profound effects on population health, as the lack of detection of CVD increases the amount
of people who are at risk for fatal heart attacks and strokes.
In the private medical sector, several primary care physicians and midlevels can
provide CVD screening. Family medicine/general practice physicians, internal medicine
physicians, as well as mid-levels such as physician assistants (PAs), nurse practitioners
(NPs), and advanced practice registered nurses (APRNs) can provide CVD screening
services. As of 2012, there were 27,076 cardiologists90, 126,865 family medicine/general
practice physicians, and 177,779 internal medicine physicians in the United States.55 The
primary care physician workforce totals 432,726 practitioners. In addition, the trend in the
number of PAs practicing has more than doubled in the last decade79 and currently PAs total
91,982.80 Nurse practitioners total 174,91881 and nearly 162,179 advanced practice
registered nurses were active in 2012.82 Furthermore, practitioners in FQHCs can also
provide CVD screening services. In 2013, roughly 1,202 federally qualified health centers
operated across the United States.56
At present, policies from the ACA are pushing to reduce excessive emergency
department usage and hospital readmissions. Cardiovascular related events, such as
congestive heart failure among adults, are cited as common conditions for the emergency
department91 as well as hospital readmissions.92 LHDs that offer clinical preventive
screening activities, such as CVD screening, could possibly play a role in mitigating
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excessive ED visits and hospital readmissions, especially in low resourced urban and rural
communities. Cardiovascular screening, done in the early stages, can slow the progression
of disease.
Exploring innovative and cost-effective ways to ensure access to CVD screening will
take efforts from both private healthcare and public health systems, and LHDs may play a
major role in finding the solution. Low resource communities and uninsured individuals
who do not have access to a FQHC could rely on LHDs for this service. On the contrary,
since more people are now becoming insured through the health insurance exchanges and
Medicaid expansions, LHDs may reconsider the role of offering clinical preventive services
and let others in the community provide them instead.
It is possible that a substitution effect among providers could be occurring, and it is
imperative to understand this possible substitution effect. Therefore, we hypothesize that a
LHD’s choice to provide CVD screening is conditional on the availability and supply of
private healthcare providers in the community.
Conceptual framework
This study is supported several organizational and management theories. Politicaleconomy provides a framework on how the political and economic environments can
influence organizational structure and decisions. Random utility maximization (RUT)
provide theoretical foundation for a LHD’s choice to be involved with CVD disease
screening.
The political-economy theories have several attributes that are transferable to public
agencies such as LHDs. Resources of (1) legitimacy and power (i.e., political) and (2)
production resources (i.e., economic)21 must be attained by an organization in order to
survive and produce services. Furthermore, there is influence from the task environment.
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The task environment is made up of governmental and non-governmental organizations,
interest groups, and stakeholders who have control of resources needed by the organization.
Furthermore, another attribute is resource dependence.28 As an organization becomes more
dependent on resources controlled by an external entity, the influence of that entity on the
organization increases as well. Furthermore, an organization strives to achieve stability in
the flow of external resources but also still have autonomy. Therefore, the organization can
strategize through competition or co-optation to survive.29 Lastly, within an organization,
power and economic relations control the application of service technology and how
decision-making units are distributed among the organizational divisions.
Furthermore, an organization such as a LHD may choose an option that produces the
highest utility. In economics, utility can be described as the degree of “want-satisfaction”
provided by a product or service. Choice behavior is contingent upon the assumption that
individuals make rational choices but utility and choice prediction are not measured with
complete accuracy. Hence, in random utility models,
𝑢𝑖𝑗 = 𝑣𝑖𝑗 + 𝜀𝑖𝑗
where utility, 𝑢𝑖𝑗 , given to individual i by choice j is made up of a deterministic
component, 𝑣𝑖𝑗 , and an unobserved stochastic error component, 𝜀𝑖𝑗 .
Methods
We hypothesized that a LHD’s choice to be involved in CVD screening activities is
dependent on the availability and supply of other healthcare providers in the community
independent of LHD funding. Although cardiologists can perform CVD disease screening,
they were excluded from our study because this preventive services is commonly performed
by primary care physicians and midlevels. We also assumed that if the screening results
require specialized attention or treatment, then the cardiologist is referred. Therefore, we
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made the assumption that CVD screening performed in the LHD or in other primary care
settings practice primary prevention. Secondary and tertiary prevention would be conducted
by a cardiologist, so we excluded them from the analysis.
The final dataset was created from three sources. The primary dataset of interest was
the National Association of County and City Officials (NACCHO) Profile Survey 2013.
Rhode Island and Hawaii were not included in the survey because they do not have LHDs.
We merged the NACCHO Profile with the NACCHO Boundary Files. The Boundary Files
contain Federal Information Processing Standard (FIPS) County codes. We obtained the
FIPS County codes in order to merge the NACCHO datasets with the Area Health Resource
File (AHRF). Since our cross-sectional study focused on the year 2013, we pulled data from
the 2013-2014 and 2014-2015 AHRF files. We only analyzed county and multi-county level
LHDs and excluded LHDs classified as city, city-county, or multi-city. For multi-city
jurisdictions, variables that contained count data were aggregated and population weighted
averages were calculated. A total of 1,645 LHDs were contained in the master dataset.
We conducted several specification tests to determine the preferred model, We first
compared a binary logit estimation model with interaction terms and one without
(parsimonious). We also conducted pairwise correlation tests. We determined that all
covariates should be kept in the model. No variables were severely collinear, according to
the variance of inflation factor (VIF). The parsimonious model and the model with
interaction terms are illustrated in Appendix I. An insignificant LR test revealed that the
parsimonious model is the preferred model. A binary logit estimation with the parsimonious
model was estimated, with the dependent variable as, “not involved =0” and “involved=1.”
Not involved is defined as the LHD is not involved in the provision of CVD screening, since
others in the community independent of LHD funding already provides the service.
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A multinomial logit model estimation was then conducted, with the three choices in
the dependent variable. In our study, the choices a LHD might face would be to (1) remain
uninvolved and let others in the community independent of LHD funding provide the service;
(2) contract out the service; or (3) perform CVD screening directly. To test the independence
of irrelevant alternative assumption (IIA) inherent in multinomial models, we applied a
Hausman test (see Appendix I). It is important to point out, however, that recent research
reveals that the Hausman tests performs poorly, even in large sample sizes.68 Because of the
failed results of the test, we executed sequential logit estimations, also known as hierarchical
logit estimations.
A sequential logit model is structured with decisions made in a stages. We followed
the procedure outlined by Rodriguez.69 We assumed that a LHD experiences two transition
phases (see Figure 1). Transition 1 consists of whether (or not) a LHD is involved in
performing a screening service. If it is involved, then the LHD enters Transition 2. Among
only those LHDs that selected “yes” it is involved with the provision of CVD screening, they
then enter the next transition. Transition 2 consists of whether (or not) the LHD directly
performs the service or contracts it out.
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Figure 4.1 Conceptual Framework for the Discrete Choice CVD Models. A LHD is first faced with the
choice to become involved with the provision of cardiovascular disease screening. By contrast, a LHD
could also choose to be uninvolved in the screening activities, letting others (i.e., private practices,
hospitals, FQHCs) independent of LHD funding provide the service to the community. If the LHD does
choose to be involved, then it has two options: (1) directly perform the service or (2) contract out the service
to other healthcare professionals in the community.

Each transition phase represents two separate binary logit estimations. Transition 1,
the base (omitted reference group) is “not involved,” and for Transition 2, it was “perform
directly.” Each sequential logit model generates its own separate log likelihood values that
are then added together. The overall sequential logit model log likelihood value can then be
calculated. The summed value would then be manually and computationally compared
against the log likelihood value of the multinomial estimation. However, for the
cardiovascular disease screening model, the sequential logit model for Transition 1 was not
statistically significant, and Transition 2 could not be estimated because of too many missing
values. The multinomial logit model proved to be the superior model.
Because we hypothesized that the choice to be involved in CVD screening activities
is conditional on the availability and supply of other healthcare providers in the community,
the dependent variable is a discrete choice (0,1). For the multinomial logit estimation, we
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increased the choice set to three choices: (1) stay uninvolved and let others in the community
provide the service (base); (2) contract out; or (3) directly perform the service. It is important
to note that the LHD survey respondent for the NACCHO Profile was allowed to select more
than one option. To correct for only one choice per LHD, we coded the dependent variables
to account for the most logical decision. For example, if a LHD survey respondent selected
that his or her agency performs the CVD screening activity directly and selected that others
in the community also provide the service, the code would generate a “1” for the choice of
“directly performing.” Only one choice per observation is required for the discrete choice
models.
Our primary independent variables of interest are the other providers in the
community independent of LHD funding. Those are primary care physicians and midlevels
(i.e., physician assistants, nurse practitioners, and advanced practice nurses). Besides these
providers, we also controlled for institutional, financial, and community covariates
previously investigated in other public health services and systems research studies.11,23,24
For healthcare supply factors, we controlled for primary care physicians per 10,000
population, midlevels per 10,000 population, total hospital beds per 100,000 population,
and the presence of a federally qualified health center (FQHC) since recent research
illustrates that primary care provision in LHDs is a function of the presence of a FQHC.13
The total hospitals beds per 100,000 is a reflection of capacity, and is therefore a better
measure for the potential substitution effect, as opposed to the total number of short term
general hospitals.
We controlled for sociodemographic factors of the percentages of non-white race,
Hispanic ethnicity, in poverty, and uninsured. These variables are known to affect the
provision of clinical or personal healthcare services, as low income, uninsured, and indigent
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populations rely on safety-nets for their healthcare needs.
LHD staffing and leadership variables were LHD staff per 10,000 population,
percentage of LHDs with a clinician (MD, DO) executive director, and percentage of LHDs
with a public health (MPH, DrPH) executive director. Previous research sheds light on the
role of an increasing number of LHD staff per 10,000 and a clinician executive director on
the provision of directly performing cardiovascular disease screening in LHDs.13
The political and economic environment can influence an organization’s choices.
Therefore, we included the presence of a local board of health (LBOH) to measure LHD
autonomy and controlled for the state-local administrative relationship. Previous studies
have documented the effect of governance characteristics, such as centralized governance
and its association with spending decisions.84 This variable was categorized into shared
(omitted), local, or state governance.
For LHD geographic location, three dummy variables of rural (omitted), urban
(nonmetro), and metro were created, following the classification system established by the
2013 Rural Urban Commuting Area (RUCA) codes. RUCA categories 1–3 were coded as
metro, categories 4–7 were coded as urban (nonmetro), and categories 8-9 were coded as
rural.59
For LHD jurisdiction type, we included only single county (omitted) or multi-county
variables. The most common type of LHD in the United States is the county LHD.
LHD jurisdiction population size served may play a role in the decision to become
involved in CVD screening, as smaller LHDs may be more likely contract out or share
resources across jurisdictions. Furthermore, larger LHDs may have adequate capacity to
offer services beyond the traditional public health activities. Thus, we categorized this
variables into 5 categories: population size served < 25,000; 25,000-49,999; 50,000-99,999,
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100,000 – 499,999 and >500,000.
Results
Summary statistics for the study sample are illustrated in Table 4.1. Less than half
(41.3%) of LHDs provide CVD screening services. The majority of the sample is composed
of single county LHDs (88.9%), in which only 11.1% are multi-county LHDs. A FQHC is
present in 58.6% of the counties sampled. The number of total hospital beds per 100,000
population average around 325 beds, and there are 5.8 primary care physicians and 11.7
midlevels per 10,000 population. The majority of the sample is composed of individuals who
are classified as “white race” (84.8%), while 15.2% of the study sample are classified as nonwhite race. Furthermore, over 16% of the sample is considered to be in poverty or uninsured.
Approximately 36% of LHDs in the sample served populations less than 25,000, and only
7% of LHDs served population sizes larger than 500,000. On average, there are 5.8 primary
care physicians and 11.7 midlevels per 10,000 population. Geographic region is divided into
three main classifications, with 38.9% of LHDs located in metro areas, 38.6% in urban
(nonmetro), and only 13.9% in rural regions.
Table 4.1 - Sample Summary Statistics
Variable
Health care supply factors
Primary care physicians per 10000 population
Midlevels (PAs, NPs, APRNs) per 10000 population
FQHC present in counties, %
FQHC delivery sites per 100000 population
Total hospital beds per 100000 population
General hospitals per 100000 population
Demographic factors
% White race
% Non-white race
% Hispanic ethnicity
% In poverty
% Uninsured
LHD service provision
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Mean (SD)

Range

5.8 (3.2)
11.7 (7.6 )
58.6
3.6 (8.8)
324.9 (430.06)
4.63 (7.4)

0-24.5
0-100.9
0-128
0-208.2
0-7815.9
0-86.2

84.8 (14.6)
15.2 (14.6)
7.1 (10.3)
16.6 (5.7)
16.5 (4.8)

15.5-99
.99-84.5
.22-95.7
3.8-41.1
6-36.8

% LHDs providing CVD screening
0-100
29.3
LHD staffing and leadership
LHD staff per 10000 LHD population
8.9 (10.8)
0-195.8
% LHDs with clinician (MD, DO) executive director
0-100
11.9
% LHDs with public health (MPH, DrPH) executive director
0-100
19.3
LHD governance characteristics
Local board of health (LBOH) present
70.3
0-100
State governance
0-100
22.4
Local governance
0-100
66.8
Shared governance
0-100
10.8
LHDs by location
% Metro
0-100
38.9
% Urban (nonmetro)
0-100
38.6
% Rural
13.9
0-100
LHDs by jurisdiction
% County
0-100
88.9
% Multi-county
0-100
11.1
LHD jurisdiction population size served
Population size served < 25,000
36.0
0-100
Population size served 25,000 - 49,999
0-100
20.1
Population size served 50,000 - 99,999
0-100
15.8
Population size served 100,000 - 499,999
21.0
0-100
Population size served > 500,000
7.0
0-100
N = 1,645 Local Health Departments
Abbreviations: FQHC, federally qualified health center; LHD, local health department

The results of the binary logit estimation are illustrated in Table 4.2. Results of the
multinomial model are presented in Table 4.3. The results of the sequential logit model are
not included in this paper, since the multinomial model proved to be a superior model to the
sequential logits, and the second transition could not be computed due to too many missing
observations.
Beta values and standard errors, as well as marginal effects (MEs) along with
standard errors are reported. The signs of beta values may not have the same sign as the MEs.
Therefore, our main interest is in how probabilities change as the covariates change. MEs
will provide that information.63 Therefore, interpretation of the results refer to the
statistically significant MEs.
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The results of the binary logit estimation are illustrated in Table 4.2. Referring to the
marginal effects, the presence of a FQHC decreases the probability of being involved in
delivering cardiovascular disease screening services, as opposed to choosing to not be
involved by 8.93% (p<.001). Likewise, a unit increase in the percentage of non-white race
decreases the probability of being involved by .35% (p<.001). An increase in the number of
LHD staff employed per 10,000 population increases the probability of being involved in
CVD screening by .45% (p<.001). However, having a clinician executive director of a LHD
decreases involvement with CVD screening by 10.64% (p<.01). Furthermore, having a state
or local governance decreases the probability of being involved by 28.96% (p<.001) and
27.31% (p<.001), respectively. On the other hand, LHDs with jurisdiction population sizes
of 50,000-99,000, 100,000-499,999 and greater than 500,000 significantly increases the
probability of being involved with CVD screening by 10.91% (p<.01), 18.3% (p<.01), and
33.5% (p<.001), respectively.
Table 4.2 - Results of the Binary Logit Estimation of Whether or Not a LHD is Involved in
Delivering CVD Screening Activity
Variable
FQHC present in counties
Total hospital beds per 100000 population
Primary care physicians per 10000 population
Midlevels (PAs, NPs, APRNs) per 10000 population
% Non-white race
% Hispanic ethnicity
% In poverty
% Uninsured
LHD staff per 10000 LHD population
LHD with clinician (MD, DO) executive director
LHD has a public health (MPH, DrPH) executive
director
Local board of health (LBOH) present
Centralization (shared is omitted reference group)
State governance
Local governance
LHD location (Rural is omitted reference group)
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β
-0.466a
0.000
-0.051
0.012
-0.018a
-0.005
0.063
0.019
0.024a
-0.617b

SE
0.145
0.000
0.026
0.010
0.006
0.007
0.015
0.018
0.007
0.213

ME
-0.0893a
0.0000
-0.0097
0.0024
-0.0035a
-0.0010
0.0120
0.0037
0.0045a
-0.1064b

0.182

0.152

0.242

0.145

0.0353
0.0450

-1.321a
-1.232a

0.221
0.200

-0.2896a
-0.2731a

SE
0.0276
0.0000
0.0049
0.0019
0.0010
0.0014
0.0028
0.0034
0.0013
0.0325
0.0300
0.0264
0.0478
0.0454

Metro
0.439
0.228
0.0849
Urban (nonmetro)
0.164
0.202
0.0313
LHD jurisdiction population size served (<25,000 is
omitted reference group)
Population size served 25,000 - 49,999
0.267
0.185
0.0452
b
Population size served 50,000 - 99,999
0.207
0.603
0.1091b
Population size served 100,000 - 499,999
0.247
0.744b
0.1380b
a
Population size served > 500,000
0.351
1.638
0.3353a
LHD jurisdiction (county is omitted reference group)
-0.005
0.249
-0.0009
N = 1,547 Local Health Departments
Log likelihood = -874.3417
Abbreviations: ME, marginal effect; FQHC, federally qualified health center; LHD, local health
department
a
P <.001
b
P <.01

0.0445
0.0388

0.0314
0.0376
0.0458
0.0696
0.0473

Contract Out
The results of the multinomial logit estimation are presented in Table 3. There were
only two statistically significant variables with the choice to contract out. When focusing on
the choice to contract out service, the presence of a FQHC increases the probability of a LHD
contracting out CVD screening services by .1% (p<.05) as opposed to staying uninvolved.
In addition, being a multi-county LHD decreases the probability of contracting out this
service by .1% (p<.05) as well.
Perform Directly
Moreover, having a FQHC in the county decreases the probability of a LHD’s choice
to directly perform cardiovascular screening service activity by 10% (p<.001), as opposed
choosing to be uninvolved. Furthermore, a unit increase in the number of primary care
physicians per 10,000 decreases the probability of a LHD choosing to directly perform this
service by approximately 1% (p<.01). The presence of a clinician executive director
decreases the probability of directly performing CVD services by 10.72%. As the percentage
of non-white individuals increase, the probability decreases by .34% (p<.001). In addition,
having a state or local governance decreases the probability of directly performing the
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service by 28% and 26.9%, respectively. On the contrary, as the percentage of people in
poverty increases, the probability of directly performing cardiovascular disease screening
increases by 1.17% (p<.001). As the number of LHD staff per 10,000 population increases,
the probability of directly performing this service also increases by .43% (p<.001).
Jurisdiction population size served of 100,000 to 499,999 and greater than 500,000 increases
the probability of directly performing CVD screening by 13% (p<.01) and 33.8% (p<.001).
Lastly, LHD location in a metro area increases the probability of directly performing this
service by 8.7% (p<.05).
Table 4.3 - Results of the Multinomial Logit Estimation of CVD Screening Activity Delivery Choice (Not involved
(Base), Contract Out, or Perform Directly)
Contract out
Perform directly
Variable
β
SE
ME
SE
β
SE
ME
SE
Primary care physicians per
10000 population
Midlevels (PAs, NPs, APRNs)
per 10000 population
FQHC present in counties
Total hospital beds per
100000 population
% Non-white race
% Hispanic ethnicity
% In poverty
% Uninsured
LHD staff per 10000 LHD
population
LHD with clinician (MD, DO)
executive director
LHD has a public health
(MPH, DrPH) executive
director
Local board of health (LBOH)
present
Centralization (shared is
omitted reference group)
State governance
Local governance
LHD location (Rural is
omitted reference group)

0.0518

0.1025

0.0006

0.0008

-0.0548c

0.0264

-0.0104c

0.0049

0.0275

0.0362

0.0002

0.0003

0.0119

0.0100

0.0022

0.0019

1.3643

0.8648

0.0099c

0.0050

-0.5125a

-0.0016

0.0018

0.0000

0.0000

0.0001

-0.0296
-0.0070
0.0584
-0.0355

0.0308
0.0392
0.0658
0.0869

-0.0002
0.0000
0.0003
-0.0003

0.0003
0.0003
0.0005
0.0007

-0.0183b
-0.0054
0.0632a
0.0211

0.0056 -0.0034a
0.0075 -0.0010
0.0152 0.0117a
0.0180 0.0041

0.0010
0.0014
0.0028
0.0034

0.0290

0.0185

0.0002

0.0002

0.0235b

0.0068

0.0043a

0.0012

-0.0902

0.8861

0.0008

0.0076

-0.6369b 0.2163 -0.1072a

0.0320

-0.0590

0.7275

-0.0010

0.0056

0.1864

0.1533

0.0358

0.0298

0.7138

0.8530

0.0044

0.0050

0.2297

0.1464

0.0406

0.0262

-1.7313
-0.9337

1.2942
0.8836

-0.0092
-0.0045

0.0107
0.0107

-1.3172a
-1.2426a
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0.1465 -0.0996a

0.0274

0.0002

0.0000

0.0000

0.2218 -0.2813a
0.2015 -0.2689a

0.0477
0.0454

Metro
-0.2557
1.2681
-0.0033 0.0111
0.4549c 0.2299 0.0874c
Urban (nonmetro)
-0.2776
1.0821
-0.0026 0.0081
0.1772 0.2041 0.0341
LHD jurisdiction population
size served (<25,000 is
omitted reference group)
Population size served
0.4734
0.9424
0.0033 0.0079
0.2645 0.1865 0.0427
25,000 - 49,999
Population size served
-13.193 618.259 -0.0068 0.0047
0.6445b 0.2083 0.1174
50,000 - 99,999
Population size served
0.9979
1.2756
0.0076 0.0134
0.7395b 0.2497 0.1313b
100,000 - 499,999
Population size served >
0.8399
1.7769
0.0012 0.0131
1.6758a 0.3540 0.3376
500,000
LHD jurisdiction (county is
702.4286 -0.0099c 0.0031
0.0416 0.2500 0.0111
omitted reference group)
13.9866
Log likelihood = -922.97802
N = 1,547 Local Health
Departments
Abbreviations: ME, marginal effect; FQHC, federally qualified health center; LHD, local health department
a
P <.001
b
P <.01
c
P <.05

0.0441
0.0385

0.0310
1.0428
0.0455
0.0698
0.0475

Discussion
The multinomial model reveals that the increase in the number of primary care
physicians per 10,000 population decreases the probability that the LHD will directly
perform CVD screening by 1%. This supports our hypothesis. It also supports the possible
existence of a substitution effect that may have occurred in the communities in the study
sample.
Moreover, the presence of a clinician executive director is strongly associated with
declines in the probability of directly performing CVD screening. This finding could
possibly be explained by the fact that that the clinician director prefers to stay uninvolved in
the provision of this service because he or she believes that CVD screening should be done
by the other providers in the community.
As the number of staff hired in a LHD increases, so does the increase in the
probability of a LHD directly performing CVD screening. In addition, this finding also
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supports previous evidence that an increase in LHD staff has a positive association with
declines in CVD mortality.93 Wright & Nice13 mentioned that the direction of the relationship
is difficult to discern, however. They posit that a LHD may choose to offer screening services
because of a belief that the community needs them and consequently, the LHD then hires
necessary staff. The other explanation is that LHDs with adequate resources may choose to
expand their scope of service no matter the community need.
The presence of a FQHC produces significant results in regards to both choices. The
results from the multinomial model reveal that having a FQHC in the LHD jurisdiction
increases the probability of contracting out CVD screening. This increase may be due, in
part, by shared service arrangements between LHDs and FQHCs.94 LHD and FQHC
partnerships are encouraged, and recommendations in 2010 were made to highlight effective
ways to do so.94 The presence of a FQHC also decreases the probability of directly
performing it, further supporting the choice to contract out instead. Furthermore, CVD is
among the top three primary diagnoses in FQHCs.
The results also revealed important findings from the demand side. In terms of
sociodemographic characteristics, an increase in the percentage of non-white individuals
decreases the probability of directly performing the service. A possible explanation could be
that non-white individuals may prefer to go to another health system, more specifically, a
FQHC. Recent evidence points out that residents actually prefer the type of care they receive
in FQHCs.17 Furthermore, more than half of the patients in a FQHC are racial minorities.95
It is probable that low income racial minorities, who make up the majority of the patient base
in FQHCs, are the same group we observe is associated with the decreased probability of
directly performing CVD screening. This further supports why the presence of a FHQC
increases the probability of contracting out this service since LHDs and FQHCs are
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encouraged to collaborate.94 On the other hand, however, as the percentage of people in
poverty increases, so does the probability of directly performing CVD screening. This may
be because some directors believe that offering clinical preventive services is a part of the
overall mission of public health, or some LHDs may simply have the resources and
capabilities to perform CVD screening directly.
Having a state or local governance decreases the probability of performing this
service directly, as opposed to staying uninvolved. Since the degree of centralization may
have consequential influence on spending,84 it may also play a role in why LHDs opt to stay
uninvolved when they have a state or local governance. State and local agencies may choose
to stay uninvolved either because of financial and budgetary reasons, or it is because decision
makers are aware of other providers in the community can provide this service instead.
Lastly, LHD location in a metro area increases the probability of directly performing
this service. Moreover, jurisdiction population size served of 99,999 to 499,999 and greater
than 500,000 increase the probability of directly performing CVD screening as well. These
findings support evidence on the existence of rural-urban disparities in CVD screening. It
also supports the supposition that LHDs in larger jurisdictions may choose to directly
perform CVD screening regardless of the presence of private providers in the community
because of adequate resources and capacity.13
These results contribute to a priority area in both public health and medicine. As
heart disease is the number one cause of death, finding best practices between both fields
calls for synergy and collaborations to find the best strategies to improve population health
and curb costs. Early detection through screening, coupled with drug adherence, can give
out national hope in eliminating CVD.96
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Limitations
There are a few limitations in this study. First, our study has a cross-sectional study
design. No cause-effect relationship is implicated. Future studies could have a longitudinal
study design to strengthen the associations and uncover trends over time. This could be done
in the near future after the 2016 NACCHO Profile Survey and 2015-2016 AHRF are
released. Furthermore, external validity is limited to county and multi-county LHDs only.
City, city-county, and multi-city LHDs were excluded from this study, and therefore the
results cannot be generalized to all LHDs in the United States. However, the majority of
LHDs across the United States are on the county level.
Conclusions
In conclusion, our hypothesis was correct. Our results support the supposition that a
LHD’s choice to be involved with CVD screening is dependent on the availability or supply
of private providers (i.e., primary care physicians). Other significant associations concerning
LHD staff, population size served, metropolitan location, and the presence of a FQHC are
noteworthy, especially with the choice to contract out. This study implies that CVD
screening services entail a complex relationship with other providers as well as FQHCs.
Moreover, the evidence from this study provides further support that increases in LHD staff
is associated with the reduction of CVD mortality. It also supports provides further support
for public health funding. Mays and Smith who revealed over a 13 year time period, for
every 10% increase in public health spending, CVD mortality rates fell by 3.2%.84 In
summary, the interplay between public health inputs and population health outcomes further
illustrate the need to support public health practice policy.
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CHAPTER 5
IMPLICATIONS FOR PUBLIC HEALTH
Introduction
The private healthcare sector includes physicians, physician assistants, nurse
practitioners, and advanced practice registered nurses (midlevels). Private practices and
clinics are often thought as the usual sources of care for clinical preventive services.
However, other health systems in the public sector, such as federally qualified health centers
(FQHCs) and local health departments (LHDs) also offer these services along with
In 2012, the Institute of Medicine (IOM) published a report entitled, Primary Care
and Public Health: Exploring Integration to Improve Population Health, and reminded us
all of the need for integration and collaboration among health systems in order to achieve
optimal population health outcomes. Neither medical care nor public health alone can save
our nation’s health. Therefore, it is of utmost importance to re-examine the provision of
health healthcare services among LHDs12 and understand a LHD’s choice to be involved
with disease screening activities, such as cancer and cardiovascular disease screening.
It was posited that the provision of such services is conditional on the supply and
availability of private healthcare providers in the community who are independent of LHD
funding, suggesting a substitution effect. Thus, we hypothesized that a LHD’s choice to be
involved in either cancer or CVD screening, by either directly performing the service or
contracting it out, is conditional on the availability and capacity of other providers who are
independent of LHD funding in the community. Using a cross-sectional study design, we
used maximum likelihood estimation with binomial, multinomial, and sequential logit
models to test our hypotheses.
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We first merged the 2013 NACCHO Profile Survey with the 2013 NACCHO
Boundary Files and the 2013-2014 and 2014-2015 Area Health Resource Files (AHRF).
Results for each service were surprisingly different. A LHD’s choice to be involved with the
provision of cancer screening is not associated with the availability of other healthcare
providers in the community. However, the training (degree) of the LHD director (MPH,
DrPH), key sociodemographic variables, governance characteristics, and jurisdiction
population size may have some influence in the decision making process since those
covariates were statistically significant. For CVD screening, results illustrated that the
LHD’s choice to be involved by directly performing CVD screening is associated with the
availability of private providers in the community. Other key variables such as the number
of LHD staff, metro location, governance, and jurisdiction population size were strongly
associated with a LHD’s decision.
Cancer screening: Implications for public health practice and policy
The results of our studies revealed both surprising and consistent results from
previous studies. TAlthough the results suggest that the availability and supply of private
healthcare providers who are independent of LHD funding are not associated with a LHD’s
decision to be involved with cancer screening, we learned valuable information regardless.
Perhaps it is not a substitution effect we should be investigating, but a synergistic one.
Moreover, one of the key characteristics that should have special attention is the training or
degree of the LHD director. The decision to be involved with cancer screening is associated
with whether or not the LHD director has a public health degree (MPH or DrPH). Another
key variable is the association with the number of LHD staff. As the number of LHD staff
increases, so does the probability that a LHD will directly perform cancer screening. From a
practice standpoint, these findings help to validate the vast contribution of public health staff
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and management in the improvement of population health outcomes.
Because of the nature of the survey, NACCHO asked the survey respondent if the
LHD was involved with cancer screening, but the question did not stratify cancer screening
into the differing types. However, LHDs are mainly involved with cervical, breast, and
colorectal cancer screenings. There is meaningful evidence on the effectiveness of these
screening activities, as supported by recommendations from the United States Preventive
Services Taskforce (USPSTF). However, despite these recommendations, minimal progress
in increasing cancer screening rates in the past decades have occurred. Racial and ethnic
minorities, low-income, and uninsured individuals have disproportionately higher rates of
cancer diagnoses who often present in later, more advanced stages.97 In attempts to reduce
disparities in breast and cervical cancer, Congress passed the Breast and Cervical Cancer
Mortality Prevention Act in 1990. Ten years later, the National Breast and Cervical Cancer
Early Detection Program (NBCCEDP) was implemented. Our findings illustrate several
important observations from the demand side (i.e., the uninsured or non-white populations)
and further justify the need for on-going legislation and continued federal funding support
for this program.
Part of the funding from the NBCCDEP supports both clinical and non-clinical
cancer screening components. The IOM stated in the report, Primary care and public health:
exploring integration to improve population health, “In particular, the NBCCEDP could
leverage its non-screening components to help integrate public health and primary care,
reducing an existing community clinical services gap and facilitating health care access for
a broader population than traditionally reached.98 This recommendation can open up doors
for increasing LHD staff without a clinical background. Non-clinical staff could be properly
trained through workshops, certifications, and seminars to effectively provide health
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education on the life-saving capabilities of screening as well as follow-up if precancerous
lesions or masses are found.
From a health policy perspective, it may be feasible and cost-effective if the scope of
practice for culturally competent non-clinical staff could be widened. An example could be
a non-clinical LHD staff could educate the patient while he or she is waiting for the clinician
in the exam room. This would reinforce the importance of screening and could perhaps
increase follow-up and/or treatment adherence rates. It is important to note that reminder
registries are not enough for adherence; understanding the cultural and institutional barriers
and contexts are necessary for follow-up or routine screening.99
Furthermore, the non-clinical staff could educate the patient if he or she is suspected
to need further examinations and biopsies. Less advanced clinical skills are more paramount
than ever as numerous who were previously uninsured now have access to care. Policies that
support widening the scope of practice for practitioners with less skills than midlevels (i.e.,
licensed practical nurses, LHD staff with a public health bachelor or master’s degree trained
in health behavior or health promotion) should be considered in light of the non-clinical
health education components of cancer screening. From a practice standpoint, this provides
evidence that increased funding should be allocated towards the training of the future public
health workforce. Policymakers should be informed of the importance of providing funding
and scholarships for those who wish to pursue a career in public health. Further, as many
health professional shortage areas (HPSAs) and medically underserved areas (MUAs)
struggle with physician shortages, the need for innovative ways to deliver timely and
effective clinical care to rural or low-resource communities is a priority. Timeliness of
screening is a significant factor in survival, as many invasive cancers can be caught early,
lessening the risk of more advanced treatments, costs, and deaths.
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Cardiovascular disease screening: Implications for public health practice and
policy
Heart disease is the number one cause of mortality in the United States. Many
individuals do not know that they may have early onset CVD, but screening can help identify
early risk factors, so patients can work towards eating a healthy, low sodium diet, for
example, increase physical activity levels, or take prescribed treatments, such as cholesterol
lowering statins.
The multinomial model revealed that the increase in the number of primary care
physicians per 10,000 population did indeed decrease the probability that the LHD will
directly perform CVD screening by 1%. As the population increases, so does the significance
and magnitude of this effect. This has consequences for both medical care and public health,
as it supports the existence of a substitution effect. Primary care physicians and midlevels
should consider opening up communication with public health practitioners and create a
shared dialogue on the best ways to provide CVD screening in the specific community.
The results also illustrated that an increase in the percentage of non-white racial
minorities decreases the probability of directly performing CVD screening. Racial and ethnic
minorities could simply be going to another health system, such as a FQHC for CVD
screening. However, as the percentage of people in poverty increases, so does the probability
of directly performing CVD screening. This finding may be attributed to the fact that some
LHD directors may believe that offering clinical preventive services is a part of the overall
mission of public health. Or, perhaps, some LHDs may have adequate resources to directly
perform CVD screening. Our findings support on-going legislation and funding for for
chronic disease screening low-income, uninsured, or racial and ethnic minorities who
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experience a disproportionate burden from CVD.
A multitude of ED visits are from strokes or cardiac events and chest pain is listed as
a top reason.100 The trends revealed that in general, the larger the LHD, the better resourced
it is, and the LHD has the capacity to perform CVD screening directly. However, some LHDs
display tendencies to rely on others who are independent of public health funding (e.g.,
FQHCs) to provide the service. Findings associated with declines in CVD mortality rates,
supported through increases in public health spending84 and LHD staff employed93 further
justify the need for some LHDs to directly perform CVD screening.
Conclusion
In conclusion, cancer and cardiovascular disease screenings give many people a
chance to live healthier, better lives. Because of our findings, improving individualized
patient care can lead to real impacts on population health. Health systems should work
toward a common goal to reduce cancer and CVD morbidities and mortalities. Emphasis
should be on the lifespan, with primary, secondary, and tertiary prevention, for health and
wellness are dynamic. With evidence from novel findings that increases in public health
spending leads to dramatic decreases in both cancer and CVD mortality,84 Congress and state
legislatures should realize the overall and long-term impact of prevention and the need for
on-going research to inform best practices and health policies.
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APPENDIX I
SPECIFICATION TESTS
Finding the preferred model (binomial logit models)
Parsimonious model without interaction terms
logit p = β0 + fqhcpresβ1 + per100_totalhospbedsβ2 + per10_primcarephysβ3 + per10_midlevelsβ4
+ p_percentpplnonwhite2013β5 + p_percentpplhisp2013β6 + p_percentpplinpov2013β7
+ p_percentpplunins2013β8 + lhdemployper10β9 + clindirpresβ10 + phdirpresβ11
+ lbohβ12 + c0govcatβ13 + rucametro β14 + rucaurbanβ15 + jurspopsizecat16 + ε
With interaction terms
logit p = β0 + fqhcpresβ1 + per100_totalhospbedsβ2 + per10_primcarephysβ3 + per10_midlevelsβ4
+ p_percentpplnonwhite2013β5 + p_percentpplhisp2013β6 + p_percentpplinpov2013β7
+ p_percentpplunins2013β8 + lhdemployper10β9 + clindirpresβ10 + phdirpresβ11
+ lbohβ12 + c0govcatβ13 + rucametro β14 + rucaurbanβ15 + rucametro*per10_primcarephysβ16
+ rucametro*per10_midlevelsβ17 + rucaurban* per10_primcarephys18
+ rucaurban* per10_midlevelsβ19 + jurspopsizecat20 + ε
The “logit p” is the log of the probability of choosing the discrete choice dependent variable (0,1).
Hausman Test Results
*HAUSMAN TEST OUTPUT FOR CANCER SCREENING MNL MODEL
Note: the rank of the differenced variance matrix (0) does not equal the number of
coefficients being tested (50); be sure this is what you expect, or there may be
problems computing the test. Examine the output of your estimators
for anything unexpected and possibly consider scaling your variables so that
the coefficients are on a similar scale.
---- Coefficients ---|
(b)
(B)
(b-B)
sqrt(diag(V_b-V_B))
|
partial
all
Difference
S.E.
-------------+---------------------------------------------------------------contract
|
2.jurisdic~e |
-1.476891
-1.476891
0
0
1.fqhcpres |
.728354
.728354
0
0
p_perc~e2013 |
.0093413
.0093413
0
0
p_perc~p2013 |
-.004984
-.004984
0
0
p_perc~v2013 |
.0448418
.0448418
0
0
p_perc~s2013 |
-.1011442
-.1011442
0
0
lhdemploy~10 |
.0242913
.0242913
0
0
1.clindirp~s |
-.0540225
-.0540225
0
0
1.phdirpres |
-.2418583
-.2418583
0
0
1.lbohpres |
.5923794
.5923794
0
0
1bn.c0govcat |
-2.995445
-2.995445
0
0
2.c0govcat |
-2.536145
-2.536145
0
0
1.rucametro |
.5246477
.5246477
0
0
1.rucaurban |
-.2102856
-.2102856
0
0
1bn.jurspo~t |
.6111563
.6111563
0
0
2.jurspops~t |
.8403058
.8403058
0
0
3.jurspops~t |
.9018718
.9018718
0
0
4.jurspops~t |
1.215918
1.215918
0
0
per10_prim~s |
.0132599
.0132599
0
0
1.rucametr~s |
-.0702391
-.0702391
0
0
per10_midl~s |
.016384
.016384
0
0
1.rucametr~s |
.0086368
.0086368
0
0
per100_tot~s |
.0001756
.0001756
0
0
1.rucametr~s |
-.0006454
-.0006454
0
0
_cons |
-1.583586
-1.583586
0
0
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-------------+---------------------------------------------------------------direct
|
2.jurisdic~e |
.2463095
.2463095
0
0
1.fqhcpres |
.0279319
.0279319
0
0
p_perc~e2013 |
-.0065667
-.0065667
0
0
p_perc~p2013 |
-.0123565
-.0123565
0
0
p_perc~v2013 |
.0613967
.0613967
0
0
p_perc~s2013 |
.0415392
.0415392
0
0
lhdemploy~10 |
.0185718
.0185718
0
0
1.clindirp~s |
-.2508029
-.2508029
0
0
1.phdirpres |
.2878713
.2878713
0
0
1.lbohpres |
.1560032
.1560032
0
0
1bn.c0govcat |
-1.425153
-1.425153
0
0
2.c0govcat |
-2.043053
-2.043053
0
0
1.rucametro |
.3131264
.3131264
0
0
1.rucaurban |
.1129166
.1129166
0
0
1bn.jurspo~t |
.2572065
.2572065
0
0
2.jurspops~t |
.7149778
.7149778
0
0
3.jurspops~t |
.5567551
.5567551
0
0
4.jurspops~t |
.5864557
.5864557
0
0
per10_prim~s |
.0284793
.0284793
0
0
1.rucametr~s |
-.0579207
-.0579207
0
0
per10_midl~s |
-.0257822
-.0257822
0
0
1.rucametr~s |
.0454651
.0454651
0
0
per100_tot~s |
-.0002109
-.0002109
0
0
1.rucametr~s |
-.0000809
-.0000809
0
0
_cons |
-.8244536
-.8244536
0
0
-----------------------------------------------------------------------------b = consistent under Ho and Ha; obtained from mlogit
B = inconsistent under Ha, efficient under Ho; obtained from mlogit
Test:

Ho:

difference in coefficients not systematic
chi2(0) = (b-B)'[(V_b-V_B)^(-1)](b-B)
=
0.00
Prob>chi2 =
.
(V_b-V_B is not positive definite)

*HAUSMAN TEST OUTPUT FOR CVD SCREENING MNL MODEL
Note: the rank of the differenced variance matrix (0) does not equal the number of
coefficients being tested (50); be sure this is what you expect, or there may be
problems computing the test. Examine the output of your estimators
for anything unexpected and possibly consider scaling your variables so that
the coefficients are on a similar scale.
---- Coefficients ---|
(b)
(B)
(b-B)
sqrt(diag(V_b-V_B))
|
partial
all
Difference
S.E.
-------------+---------------------------------------------------------------contract
|
2.jurisdic~e |
-14.67496
-14.67496
0
0
1.fqhcpres |
1.221286
1.221286
0
0
p_perc~e2013 |
-.0334765
-.0334765
0
0
p_perc~p2013 |
-.0056945
-.0056945
0
0
p_perc~v2013 |
.0592469
.0592469
0
0
p_perc~s2013 |
-.0269614
-.0269614
0
0
lhdemploy~10 |
.0251023
.0251023
0
0
1.clindirp~s |
-.1226309
-.1226309
0
0
1.phdirpres |
.0024495
.0024495
0
0
1.lbohpres |
.6867842
.6867842
0
0
1bn.c0govcat |
-1.770894
-1.770894
0
0
2.c0govcat |
-.8678868
-.8678868
0
0
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1.rucametro |
-.729047
-.729047
0
0
1.rucaurban |
.1098945
.1098945
0
0
1bn.jurspo~t |
.4614484
.4614484
0
0
2.jurspops~t |
-14.17041
-14.17041
0
0
3.jurspops~t |
.6986486
.6986486
0
0
4.jurspops~t |
.4149051
.4149051
0
0
per10_prim~s |
-.0804522
-.0804522
0
0
1.rucametr~s |
.2635594
.2635594
0
0
per10_midl~s |
.0591647
.0591647
0
0
1.rucametr~s |
-.0845169
-.0845169
0
0
per100_tot~s |
-.002214
-.002214
0
0
1.rucametr~s |
.0020632
.0020632
0
0
_cons |
-5.335471
-5.335471
0
0
-------------+---------------------------------------------------------------direct
|
2.jurisdic~e |
.0476698
.0476698
0
0
1.fqhcpres |
-.5051533
-.5051533
0
0
p_perc~e2013 |
-.0182128
-.0182128
0
0
p_perc~p2013 |
-.0050141
-.0050141
0
0
p_perc~v2013 |
.0652426
.0652426
0
0
p_perc~s2013 |
.0204492
.0204492
0
0
lhdemploy~10 |
.0238498
.0238498
0
0
1.clindirp~s |
-.6474553
-.6474553
0
0
1.phdirpres |
.1870254
.1870254
0
0
1.lbohpres |
.223064
.223064
0
0
1bn.c0govcat |
-1.324782
-1.324782
0
0
2.c0govcat |
-1.240968
-1.240968
0
0
1.rucametro |
.432342
.432342
0
0
1.rucaurban |
.1714027
.1714027
0
0
1bn.jurspo~t |
.2963241
.2963241
0
0
2.jurspops~t |
.67062
.67062
0
0
3.jurspops~t |
.7591342
.7591342
0
0
4.jurspops~t |
1.695354
1.695354
0
0
per10_prim~s |
-.0511455
-.0511455
0
0
1.rucametr~s |
-.0132051
-.0132051
0
0
per10_midl~s |
.0022773
.0022773
0
0
1.rucametr~s |
.0268177
.0268177
0
0
per100_tot~s |
.000162
.000162
0
0
1.rucametr~s |
-.0008557
-.0008557
0
0
_cons |
-1.437397
-1.437397
0
0
-----------------------------------------------------------------------------b = consistent under Ho and Ha; obtained from mlogit
B = inconsistent under Ha, efficient under Ho; obtained from mlogit
Test:

Ho:

difference in coefficients not systematic
chi2(0) = (b-B)'[(V_b-V_B)^(-1)](b-B)
=
0.00
Prob>chi2 =
.
(V_b-V_B is not positive definite)
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APPENDIX II
SEQUENTIAL LOGIT ESTIMATION (CANCER)
*Sequential Logit Model output for CANCER SCREENING
*Transition 1: A LHD chooses between becoming involved (1) or not involved (0)
*The binary dependent variable is "any_caninv - not involved = 0; involved =1"
*Calculating Average ME for the BIN model.
margins, dydx(*) noatlegend
*Same output that from the original BIN logit regression model.
. margins, dydx(*) noatlegend
Average marginal effects
Model VCE
: OIM

Number of obs

=

1565

Expression
: Pr(any_caninv), predict()
dy/dx w.r.t. : 1.fqhcpres per100_totalhospbeds per10_primcarephys per10_midlevels
p_percentpplnonwhite2013 p_percentpplhisp2013 p_percentpplinpov2013
p_percentpplunins2013 lhdemployper10 1.clindirpres 1.phdirpres 1.lbohpres
1.c0govcat 2.c0govcat 1.rucametro 1.rucaurban 1.jurspopsizecat
2.jurspopsizecat 3.jurspopsizecat 4.jurspopsizecat 2.jurisdiction_type
----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------|
Delta-method
|
dy/dx
Std. Err.
z
P>|z|
[95% Conf.
Interval]
-------------------------+--------------------------------------------------------------1.fqhcpres |
.0155489
.0288854
0.54
0.590
-.0410654
.0721632
per100_totalhospbeds | -.0000356
.0000345
-1.03
0.301
-.0001033
.000032
per10_primcarephys |
.0018332
.0050381
0.36
0.716
-.0080413
.0117077
per10_midlevels | -.0004886
.0020061
-0.24
0.808
-.0044204
.0034432
p_percentpplnonwhite2013 | -.0011078
.0010574
-1.05
0.295
-.0031804
.0009647
p_percentpplhisp2013 | -.0026404
.001462
-1.81
0.071
-.0055059
.000225
p_percentpplinpov2013 |
.0126472
.0029928
4.23
0.000
.0067814
.0185131
p_percentpplunins2013 |
.006767
.0035636
1.90
0.058
-.0002174
.0137514
lhdemployper10 |
.0039437
.0013901
2.84
0.005
.0012191
.0066683
1.clindirpres | -.0424295
.0388555
-1.09
0.275
-.1185848
.0337258
1.phdirpres |
.0545541
.0310692
1.76
0.079
-.0063404
.1154486
1.lbohpres |
.0393928
.0281698
1.40
0.162
-.0158191
.0946046
|
c0govcat |
1 |
-.305994
.0431654
-7.09
0.000
-.3905967
.2213913
2 | -.4355785
.0376935
-11.56
0.000
-.5094564
.3617007
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|
1.rucametro |

.1016435

.0453418

2.24

0.025

.0127751

1.rucaurban |

.0269714

.0399351

0.68

0.499

-.0513

|
jurspopsizecat |
1 |

.0530814

.0355812

1.49

0.136

-.0166565

.1905119
.1052429

.1228193
2

|

.1443993

.040708

3.55

0.000

.064613

3

|

.1174309

.0478561

2.45

0.014

.0236347

4

|

.1282085

.0695054

1.84

0.065

-.0080196

.2241855
.211227
.2644366
|
2.jurisdiction_type |
.0292782
.0495634
0.59
0.555
-.0678642
.1264206
----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------Note: dy/dx for factor levels is the discrete change from the base level.
scalar ll_a = e(ll)
predict fit_a, xb
*Transition 2: Among LHD who are involved with cancer screening activity (performing
directly or contracting out as opposed to no inv)
gen performdir=0 if canservice_type==3
replace performdir=1 if canservice_type==2
label variable performdir "perform directly = 0; contract out = 1"
label define dir 0 "perform directly" 1 "contract out"
label values performdir dir
fre performdir
. fre performdir
performdir -- perform directly = 0; contract out = 1
-----------------------------------------------------------------------|
Freq.
Percent
Valid
Cum.
---------------------------+-------------------------------------------Valid
0 perform directly |
660
40.12
92.05
92.05
1 contract out
|
57
3.47
7.95
100.00
Total
|
717
43.59
100.00
Missing .
|
928
56.41
Total
|
1645
100.00
-----------------------------------------------------------------------. logit performdir $xlist
Iteration
Iteration
Iteration
Iteration
Iteration
Iteration

0:
1:
2:
3:
4:
5:

log
log
log
log
log
log

likelihood
likelihood
likelihood
likelihood
likelihood
likelihood

=
=
=
=
=
=

-192.84987
-173.39768
-168.28581
-168.20325
-168.20299
-168.20299

Logistic regression

Number of obs
LR chi2(21)
Prob > chi2
Pseudo R2

Log likelihood = -168.20299
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=
=
=
=

702
49.29
0.0005
0.1278

-----------------------------------------------------------------------------------performdir |
Coef.
Std. Err.
z
P>|z|
[95% Conf.
Interval]
-------------------------+---------------------------------------------------------1.fqhcpres |
.5724763
.395424
1.45
0.148
-.2025405
1.347493
per100_totalhospbeds |
.000127
.0002641
0.48
0.631
-.0003906
.0006447
per10_primcarephys | -.0256841
.0604858
-0.42
0.671
-.144234
.0928658
per10_midlevels |
.0167188
.0226597
0.74
0.461
-.0276933
.061131
p_percentpplnonwhite2013 |
.0104272
.0126857
0.82
0.411
-.0144364
.0352907
p_percentpplhisp2013 |
.007368
.0226076
0.33
0.744
-.036942
.051678
p_percentpplinpov2013 | -.0202111
.0377537
-0.54
0.592
-.094207
.0537849
p_percentpplunins2013 |
-.145398
.049878
-2.92
0.004
-.243157
.0476389
lhdemployper10 |
.0048732
.0167735
0.29
0.771
-.0280023
.0377487
1.clindirpres |
.2049044
.4781375
0.43
0.668
-.7322279
1.142037
1.phdirpres | -.5164796
.4015322
-1.29
0.198
-1.303468
.270509
1.lbohpres |
.3795235
.3963619
0.96
0.338
-.3973316
1.156379
|
c0govcat |
1 | -1.540796
.6325449
-2.44
0.015
-2.780561
.3010305
2 | -.4432076
.3910854
-1.13
0.257
-1.209721
.3233057
|
1.rucametro | -.5096301
.7154592
-0.71
0.476
-1.911904
.8926442
1.rucaurban |
-.52096
.6460644
-0.81
0.420
-1.787223
.7453029
|
jurspopsizecat |
1 |
.4104269
.5369548
0.76
0.445
-.6419852
1.462839
2 |
.2007516
.6033711
0.33
0.739
-.9818339
1.383337
3 |
.1825535
.668434
0.27
0.785
-1.127553
1.49266
4 |
.3257088
.8504311
0.38
0.702
-1.341105
1.992523
|
2.jurisdiction_type | -1.738378
.9238636
-1.88
0.060
-3.549118
.0723614
_cons |
.1119881
1.160473
0.10
0.923
-2.162497
2.386473
-----------------------------------------------------------------------------------margins, dydx(*) noatlegend
scalar ll_p = e(ll)
predict fit_p, xb
di ll_a + ll_p
-1118.4908
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. mlogit canservice_type $xlist
Iteration
Iteration
Iteration
Iteration
Iteration
Iteration

0:
1:
2:
3:
4:
5:

log
log
log
log
log
log

likelihood
likelihood
likelihood
likelihood
likelihood
likelihood

=
=
=
=
=
=

-1269.3291
-1128.7312
-1117.3369
-1117.2113
-1117.2108
-1117.2108

Multinomial logistic regression

Number of obs
LR chi2(42)
Prob > chi2
Pseudo R2

Log likelihood = -1117.2108

=
=
=
=

1565
304.24
0.0000
0.1198

----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------canservice_type |
Coef.
Std. Err.
z
P>|z|
[95% Conf.
Interval]
-------------------------+---------------------------------------------------------not_involved
| (base outcome)
-------------------------+---------------------------------------------------------contract
|
1.fqhcpres |
.7140555
.3809069
1.87
0.061
-.0325083
1.460619
per100_totalhospbeds |
.0001719
.0002884
0.60
0.551
-.0003934
.0007372
per10_primcarephys | -.0239275
.0586738
-0.41
0.683
-.138926
.0910711
per10_midlevels |
.0103318
.0208026
0.50
0.619
-.0304406
.0511041
p_percentpplnonwhite2013 |
.0082686
.0125902
0.66
0.511
-.0164076
.0329449
p_percentpplhisp2013 | -.0045519
.0213185
-0.21
0.831
-.0463353
.0372316
p_percentpplinpov2013 |
.0414519
.0364809
1.14
0.256
-.0300493
.1129532
p_percentpplunins2013 | -.0994021
.0486301
-2.04
0.041
-.1947155
.0040888
lhdemployper10 |
.023836
.011786
2.02
0.043
.0007359
.046936
1.clindirpres | -.0622742
.4449387
-0.14
0.889
-.934338
.8097897
1.phdirpres | -.2503539
.3900697
-0.64
0.521
-1.014876
.5141686
1.lbohpres |
.6064821
.4013302
1.51
0.131
-.1801106
1.393075
|
c0govcat |
1 | -2.991305
.6444818
-4.64
0.000
-4.254466
1.728144
2 |
-2.54805
.4231037
-6.02
0.000
-3.377318
1.718782
|
1.rucametro |
.075051
.6799798
0.11
0.912
-1.257685
1.407787
1.rucaurban | -.1388776
.6174125
-0.22
0.822
-1.348984
1.071229
|
jurspopsizecat |
1 |
.6258986
.5175632
1.21
0.227
-.3885067
1.640304
2 |
.847844
.5757191
1.47
0.141
-.2805447
1.976233
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3

|

.892279

.649584

1.37

0.170

-.3808823

4

|

1.184628

.8320434

1.42

0.155

-.4461467

2.16544
2.815404
|
2.jurisdiction_type |
-1.3668
.903345
-1.51
0.130
-3.137324
.4037239
_cons | -1.300662
1.079715
-1.20
0.228
-3.416864
.8155403
-------------------------+--------------------------------------------------------------direct
|
1.fqhcpres |
.0181835
.139757
0.13
0.896
-.2557352
.2921022
per100_totalhospbeds | -.0002235
.0001762
-1.27
0.205
-.0005688
.0001218
per10_primcarephys |
.0104772
.0247127
0.42
0.672
-.0379589
.0589132
per10_midlevels | -.0033588
.0099048
-0.34
0.735
-.022772
.0160543
p_percentpplnonwhite2013 | -.0065511
.0051255
-1.28
0.201
-.0165969
.0034948
p_percentpplhisp2013 | -.0132462
.0071064
-1.86
0.062
-.0271746
.0006822
p_percentpplinpov2013 |
.0630056
.0147722
4.27
0.000
.0340526
.0919586
p_percentpplunins2013 |
.0428789
.0173478
2.47
0.013
.0088779
.0768799
lhdemployper10 |
.0179347
.0067364
2.66
0.008
.0047316
.0311379
1.clindirpres | -.2241178
.194993
-1.15
0.250
-.606297
.1580614
1.phdirpres |
.2938095
.1473652
1.99
0.046
.0049789
.5826401
1.lbohpres |
.1528561
.1392918
1.10
0.272
-.1201509
.425863
|
c0govcat |
1 | -1.427199
.2543352
-5.61
0.000
-1.925687
.9287112
2 | -2.028854
.2406887
-8.43
0.000
-2.500595
1.557113
|
1.rucametro |
.5101167
.2195575
2.32
0.020
.0797919
.9404415
1.rucaurban |
.1437761
.1938956
0.74
0.458
-.2362524
.5238045
|
jurspopsizecat |
1 |
.2351991
.1759924
1.34
0.181
-.1097398
.5801379
2 |
.6769865
.1980592
3.42
0.001
.2887977
1.065175
3 |
.5302248
.233122
2.27
0.023
.0733142
.9871355
4 |
.5427795
.3359615
1.62
0.106
-.115693
1.201252
|
2.jurisdiction_type |
.2393523
.236364
1.01
0.311
-.2239127
.7026172
_cons | -1.017094
.4529154
-2.25
0.025
-1.904791
.1293957
-----------------------------------------------------------------------------------scalar ll_mnl = e(ll)
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predict fit_mnl, xb
scalar dev = 2*(ll_mnl - ll_a - ll_p)
di dev, chi2tail(22,dev)
2.5600057 .99999988
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Phi Kappa Phi Honorary Society

2013 – present

National Academy of Social Insurance (NASI), Associate Member

2013 – present

AcademyHealth

2012 – present

American Public Health Association (APHA)

2013 – 2014

Gerontological Society of America (GSA)

2007 – 2009

National Society of Collegiate Scholars (NSCS)

2007 – 2009

Society for the Promotion of Undergraduate Research (SPUR)

IX. COMPUTER SKILLS
Stata, SAS, SPSS, Microsoft Excel, Adobe Photoshop CS
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X. VOLUNTEER EXPERIENCES
Volunteer for Medical Mission, Surgery Department & Primary Care Clinics, University of the
Philippines Medical Alumni Society of America, Cebu, Philippines, February 7-10, 2012
Volunteer, Clover Fork Clinic, Primary Care, Harlan, Kentucky, February 2010
Volunteer, St. Joseph Hospital, Pharmacy Department, Lexington, Kentucky, January 2007January 2009
Volunteer, St. Joseph Hospital, Surgery Department, Lexington, Kentucky, January 2007- January
2009
Volunteer, Daniel Boone Clinic & Emergency Department, Harlan Appalachian Regional Hospital,
Primary Care, Harlan, Kentucky, August 2004 - May 2005

(Student’s Signature)
(Date)
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